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On Divine Providence

AT times of universal upheavals, on the eve of great events and historical fulfilments, we are inclined to lose the sense of the individual, personal destiny of man. It seems to fade, to be lost and absorbed in the raging deep of history. Yet in reality the general course of history is deeply connected with man's personal destiny, although this link remains invisible and impenetrable. In the greatest world catastrophes the personal human fate acquires even greater significance and tragic meaning. To-day darkness covers the world, and in it is manifested the tragedy of human life and destiny. From out of the depths of this tragedy rises the mystery of God's Providence, never silent, like the hieroglyph of fate, the riddle of the sphinx, in which man must guess about himself whatever it is possible to guess. In the face of human tragedy it often seems that God either does not see or know all, or else is impotent or unwilling to act. Divine Providence about man remains behind an impenetrable veil of fate (*μοῖρα*), which in the ancient conception reigns, not only over man, but over the gods themselves. Here is the problem of problems—here is the conflict and unfathomable unity, the point of conjunction of all irreconcilable contradictions. . . .

Does God provide for the world and man, and *how* does He provide? The ways of Divine Providence remain an unsolved mystery: yet what are its general principles? Although there is in theological textbooks a whole section on Divine Providence, by which God preserves and leads the world, nevertheless the very essence of the question has been scarcely defined. For contemporary consciousness, torn by the tragic in life, this theology is both powerless and unconvincing.

Before attempting to answer the question of God's Providence, let us turn to some theological premises.

In Western theology, from St Augustine onwards, the general question of Providence is treated only in one of its

particular implications—that is, with reference to the doctrine of grace and salvation. In the controversy against Pelagianism, St Augustine has become the true progenitor of the doctrine of Predestination, which later developed so much in Roman Catholic theology, and especially in the Reformation. This was connected with the denial of free-will, which in fallen man is expressed in the natural tendency to sin; by Divine compulsion ("indeclinabilis et insuperabilis") grace saves a certain number of the elect out of the whole "massa perditionis." This thought left its mark on Catholic theology in Thomism, which accepted the central Augustinian idea of predestination to salvation, although it hesitated in face of predestination to damnation. This received its formal expression in the Tridentinum. Jansenius (seventeenth century) definitely interpreted St Augustine's teaching in terms of Predestination in so far as to evoke the condemnation of Pope Innocent X. Molinism (the teaching of the Spanish Jesuit Molina and his school), on the other hand, is an attempt to escape the one-sidedness of Thomism. In the Reformation the idea of Predestination received its most radical expression in the teaching of Calvin: God eternally predestined some to salvation and some to damnation. To accept the former and refuse the latter Calvin considered "childish," and he was evidently right. The fall of man, in which he lost his freedom, is ultimately a result of God's will. This will is absolute and demands absolute submission. Everything in the world and in human life, notwithstanding the Fall and rejection, is to the glory of God. Here the teaching of Calvin approaches surprisingly close to that of Islam: the transcendent Allah commands the trembling creature *ad majorem Dei gloriam.* The teaching of Calvin was condemned both in the West and in the East.

Let it be said again that in Western theology the question is not of the general relationship of God to the world and man, but only that of grace—*i.e.*, not of Providence, but of Salvation, which is obviously only one of the manifestations of Divine Providence, but does not exhaust it. Alike for Augustinianism and Thomism, for Jansenism and Calvinism, and even for Molinism, God in His providence about the world and man remains transcendent, acts on him from without, as on a mere product of Divine activity which witnesses to the glory of God. According to this, both the world and the human soul are objects in the hands

of the Divine Master. All activity and all freedom remain in the last resort on the side of God, and all passivity and plasticity on the side of man, who cannot have freedom as an ontological faculty of resistance in himself. In this way the whole living reality of man's destiny seems to become a pointless game of the Deity with its creation, a void and meaningless farce. But not even God's transcendence is consecutively sustained here, because God is conceived in one logical plane in time with the world, in the quality of a preceding cause—whence the very notion of *pre*-destination. This overlooks the fact that incommeasurable entities are contrasted: God and the world. Nevertheless, the relationship between them is defined in such a way that God, by His will, in the quality of *first* cause, determines the paths of the world, winds up its mechanism. Thus God enters temporal being, the process of life, as its determining agent. There results a contradiction between the supernatural transcendence of God and His cosmic immanence. On the other hand—and here is another contradiction—it is implied that the world remains quite outside God, and God outside the world; for God's action in the world is understood precisely as a *super*-natural intervention of grace and Divine life. It is true that grace *is* a supernatural Divine act in nature, the uncreated in the created. Yet this does not by any means exhaust the general relationship between God and the world, which is expressed in the disposition of Divine Providence towards it. It includes not only grace in the specific sense, but also the general action of God within the world, its " preservation and direction " (that which is sometimes called *natural* grace (*gratia naturalis*)—certainly a very ambiguous conception, which in itself should evoke a complete restatement of the whole doctrine of grace).

As the object of God's Providence man is not a mere object, a tool in the hands of God: he has his own being given to him in creation, his own nature, his own life. But at the same time this created being is not outside God, for ontologically there is no such being. The world dwells in God, although it is not God; and the relation of God to the world in Divine Providence is defined, not by the one-sided act of God on an object " extrinsic " to Him, but as the *interaction*, the life of two-in-one, as the *drama* of the Creator and the creation. This means that the interacting subjects possess their own reality, their self-existence, and at

the same time a mutual coherence and determination, which are, however, entirely absent in all the forms of the doctrine of Predestination. To become self-existent the world must be divine in its positive foundation. It *is* divine in so far as the world, to put it in terms of patristic theology, is the revelation of Divine Ideas, which in the act of creation are plunged into the void and acquire their " other-being " in the world. The one Divine Life exists both in God and in the created world, although in different ways, pre-temporarily and in time, absolutely and relatively. In virtue of its divine foundation the world preserves its self-existence in the eyes of God, though it is created out of nothing. In the creation God gave the world true *reality*, which is for ever established for the Creator Himself. In the power of this Divine reality, as well as in the power of this insuperable distinction between God and the world, the world exists both for itself and for God, and their relationship can only be conceived as living interaction. To achieve this interaction not only their reality, but their likeness and co-relatedness are essential. In man God creates His own image in all its fulness—gives him life, makes him His " other one," His friend. Yet this created world is incapable of independent life outside God—it dwells in the hands of God in its very self-existence; ultimately it cannot be cut off from God, for this would mean its annulment and annihilation. Hence the world cannot be left to itself. God " helps " the world to become itself, to fulfil its Divine-human destiny, and the centre of this interaction between God and the world is the Incarnation—God-manhood. God works unceasingly upon the world without ever turning it into a mere object or a tool. It remains a subject with its own life given to it in creation. God limits Himself voluntarily, and enters the path of interaction with the world—this is precisely Divine Providence. It is a form of God's love towards His creation. God now realizes His purpose not apart from the creation, but with it, without encroaching on its creaturely freedom and admitting its creaturely self-existence; freedom is the essential mode of its life as creation. We recognize this freedom in ourselves and in others in temporal empirical existence. But does empirical existence *exhaust* our freedom and self-determination? Does our life begin, as it were, from an empty place, the same for all? Or does it spring from a certain meta-empirical source? Do we not find in ourselves the inner self-evidence

of a certain everlasting individual quality by which we are distinguished from one another, and which we only realize in temporal existence? Here we come, I think, to the decisive point, not only of the problem of God's Providence, but also of the central mystery of human life, and therein of the whole world. Here is revealed the most mysterious and awful moment in the destiny of man, a crater ending in the ground of being.

It is evident that man's paths and destinies are different and manifold, that he comes into the world, as it were, differently qualified. How is this difference and manifoldness of human life determined? It is given above all in the individual idea of man, his special divinely created image. In God's eternity the whole plenitude of the human world, the whole created being, is seen in all its forms. They are the individual images of the creation, those seeds of being which are implanted in us, and which we realize in our life. It is both the noumenal datum, the theme for each individual being, and the principle of its special place in the world, in space and time, in history. By this creation is determined in its concrete existence. Yet God gives His creative ideas into the hands of free human beings, not as to objects, but as it were putting them at their disposal, creating them in their human freedom. *This freedom, which is the ontological privilege of created being, arises not after the creation of man, but as it were before it, with this creation, at its very limit.* The mystery of human life and human destiny lies in that in this freedom man *takes part in his own creation*, accepts it with his freedom. This participation of man in his creation is a reflection of his Divine image revealed in his very origin. The creation of human personality necessarily includes not only the Divine call to human existence, but also a response, so to say, simultaneous self-establishment of the creaturely hypostasis, or the consent of the "I" to its establishment by God. For the creation of the "*I*" is precisely the call to *self*-establishment, which is the very essence of the "I." The creative act of God calling the creaturely "I" to existence is, as it were, included in its own self-establishment, is realized in it, for it cannot have another form of realization. "I" is the self-establishing "I," "I is I"; its being is its self-establishment, which is a matter of freedom and cannot be affected by compulsion, albeit by Almighty God. "*I am*" means precisely "I *is*," a closed ring: I is. In this sense "I" is like a self-lit sun illuminating being by its own

light, and its creation is therefore also *self-creation*. The immediate intuition of man about his own " I," his own personality, conforms to this: he knows it as an unfathomable mystery, as a groundless abyss, as immeasurable depth, and at the same time as something wholly absolute, eternal in the sense of being timeless, to which he is unable to perceive a beginning or an end, or generally speaking to connect it with the flow of temporality. And even if he were to desire his own destruction, non-being, this very desire is being in its tension; and how could it be a path to self-annihilation? The eternal nature of the personality evokes here only the " eternal " torture of hell, the circling motion of a serpent in pursuit of its own tail—a magic ring where all points are simultaneously beginnings and ends. This does not by any means contradict the fact that empirically man changes and develops in time, for in the personality, the hypostatic centre, there is a point beyond time, the " spectator " which looks *into* time from *without* time.

Thus man participates with God in his own creation; more exactly man's participation is included by God in His own creative act. This mystery of the image of God in the human hypostasis cannot be further comprehended. It is the limit of our self-consciousness. In any case the scope of the creative act of God must be extended until there be included with this act, in its " *how*," not only, so to say, passive createdness, obedience to the creative " fiat," but also the creature's own answer, its consent to this " fiat," its *own* " fiat." From out of the depths of nothingness resounds this " fiat " of the creature, questioning about its own being. Such are the depths and abundance of the love of God, who passes on His own creative will to the creature He is creating, asks if it wills to be creation, and includes its answer, its self-establishment, in His own creative act. God creates man through man himself. The free is created in freedom, and is not an object at any one moment of its existence; freedom arises freely and out of freedom. If the mode of this free creation is incomprehensible for human understanding, and seems to be a *contradictio in adjecto*, the rise of freedom *after* the creation must appear no less contradictory. How can freedom *begin*, and can it begin at all? Can an object to which " thingness " is innate be robed in freedom, and is this really more comprehensible than the thought of freedom being created eternally? No, freedom does not begin, and does not arise. It is without a beginning,

timeless, and bears in itself the true image of God's timelessness—creaturely freedom in the image of the freedom of God. And this means that in a certain sense it is not created at all, but precisely included in the very act of Divine creation—*i.e.*, it is not a mere product of creation, but creation itself, the *Divine-human* creative act. It shines from out of the eternal life of God's freedom, and in this sense it is *primordial*, and is *pre-creature*, thus revealing the timelessness and "uncreated" nature of our human "I."

But this is not all. The creature does not only pronounce its free "yes" to the creative call of God to existence *in general*, but it says it in answer to a concrete and definite individual vocation. God creates not merely people differing numerically from each other, but definite personalities with definite individual destinies. And Divine creation becomes effective in that the human "I" confronts itself primordially in the power of its own freedom, and accepts the Divine challenge to life. The mode of this acceptance brings new and individual qualities into the life of man, and these qualities are now defined not only by the general character of the Divine Idea about man, but also by man's own acceptance, by personal self-realization, by personal life and personal destiny. Man is a free maker and *creator* of the theme of his life. *The life of man is creation and self-creation.*

But if this be so, we can perceive the source and the meaning of the tragedy of human life. What does God's Providence mean in the face of the innumerable sufferings and tortures of human life? If it is a transcendent external fate, the "will of God," disposing insuperably and irrevocably, or the rational order of things, a rational teleology and expediency in this "best of all worlds," there is only one way left—to refuse to accept any worlds, better or worse (*cf.* Ivan Karamazov in Dostoiefsky's great novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*). Job's comforters in their consolations are representatives of just this rational providentialism: they try to "justify" God, to cover the yawning abyss of the tragedy of life with rational considerations, to find justice and expediency in the fate of Job according to their own reasonableness. But God does not need this reasonableness, and there is more truth in Job's accusations *against* God than in the "theodicies" provided by his friends: "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?" (Job xxxviii, 2), so God speaks of all these "justifications."

What does Divine Providence reveal to us? It unveils a chain of mysteries in heaven and earth. It takes us back to the dawn of being, to that primordial day of creation, when out of the depths of nothingness there resounds the creature's answer to its own existence. Every tragedy of life has its mysterious prologue in heaven, the eternal meeting of God and man. The essence of tragedy is in the meeting of two worlds, in the primordial meeting of God and man, and in the crossing of two wills, two freedoms—Divine and human. There is no tragedy if there is but one will, but one freedom; if in the world, in creation itself, there is realized Divine Providence alone. Yet there is *human* counsel, human providence and human creativeness as well. For even to recognize and accept *Divine* Providence (" Thy will be done ") does not mean at all to negate one's human will; prayer itself is the meeting of two wills. Christianity affirms the supreme and hidden will of the Father, which, however, our filial will can and must confront. Man, too, affirms the value of the creative purpose of his life, of his " self-creation "; and thus he prays with the Son of God become man: " Let this cup pass from me." . . .

In the primordial hour man consents to himself, *chooses his destiny*, his life, his life's design. Though this life be full of darkness, bitterness and outrage—for everything is in pain at the tree of life, and it is not given to man to hide from tragedy, once he has desired to taste the terrible antimonies of life; though it be riddled with abysses, and rent by thunder and lightning—yet man *freely* chooses his path and freely defines his destiny. In the face of world tragedies, in the boundless world horrors, in the immeasurable world chasms there sounds this marvellous voice of man, his powerful creative whisper, his mysterious " let it be," " fiat," his consent and desire to be himself. And God answers this with *His* " fiat," embraces it in His own Divine creative act, and thus determines the content of human life. Truly " it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God " (Heb. x, 31), for *He gives to everyone what his soul has desired.* . . .

Yet *when* does this Divine determination and human self-determination take place? Is it an event in time? Is it possible to find such a point in time for something which precedes all time? Or is it not rather to be found in eternity? But this would make creation co-eternal with the Creator, and thus remove the gulf between them. There is

a mediating term, a "limit" between eternity and time. It belongs to eternity, although it touches createdness: but it is not time, for this only begins beyond time. It is super-time, which already pre-contains in the integral the differential of time; that created eternity (*æviternitas*) which is inherent in created being; that point out of which time unwinds and into which it is wound up. In this super-time the whole human race is called into being by the creative act of God, in Adam the All-man, although it receives temporal existence in definite times and seasons. God sees the world pre-temporarily in a single eternal act, and creates it in a single supra-temporal act together with time. This idea of the supra-temporal self-determination of human freedom, of man's individual quality at his very entrance into time, differs equally from Origen's pre-existence of the soul and from theosophical and anthropological Reincarnation. The former is bound up with Origen's special conception of the creation of the world as an evil defection from a previous spiritual state through plunging into matter. Here universal time is extended beyond the limits of its creation, and one can speak in an exact sense of *pre*-existence of the soul before its incarnation in time; while what I have in mind excludes alike any "pre" and "before." The doctrine of reincarnation, on the other hand, draws out universal time beyond the boundaries of the world, and thinks it possible to unite in a single flux of time that which takes place within this life and that which is beyond its limits. It tries, moreover, to give an answer to our own question—namely, the question of the different individual "qualities" of the soul coming into the world, of its different destinies, and explains them on the ground of the *past* of this soul in a series of reincarnations. We, however, conceive this difference to come not from the past, which does not exist—for time is unique in its concreteness; it has a beginning and an end—but from man's supra-temporal self-determination. This unites that which is given—namely, the Divine Idea about man, and his actual self-determination in the freedom of self-establishment.

God creates every man in time, sends him into the world, and disposes of the world according to His wisdom and love. As man is a created being, and consequently exists in time, his self-creation and self-determination are actualized not only in super-time, but in time as well. God does not deprive anyone of his existence who has and *asks* for it pre-

temporarily; the world and mankind preserve that which is given to them once for all in creation. Thus there arises a real interaction between God and His creation, which is precisely the foundation of Divine Providence.

In the history of the world there exists a certain mysterious and hidden plan which ensues from the supra-temporal reality of all the elements constituting this history. God takes account of the inherent nature of the world; He does not annul it, and always works on it from within and by means which do not destroy its life. In a certain sense God is not free in relation to the world, but as it were bound up with its nature, with its life and . . . with its resistance to Him. God cannot do everything that He wants with man, having once given him His own being. God's almightiness is voluntarily self-limited by the self-existence of the world, and to save the world God Himself descends into it and becomes man. Man can only guess the very general relationship of God to the world, and God's ways remain concealed from him; but only this mutually active relationship illumines the history of the world and of mankind, and at the same time the tragedy of human life. Antiquity did not know this tragedy, personal and living tragedy, and therefore conceived it as a *Moîra*, as an outer transcendent fate (Œdipus). Current Christian theology shares this lack of feeling for personal tragedy. But our time is called to look into the mysterious abyss of life, for this is already gazing at us, and is being revealed in the tragically stricken world and soul. In the dispersion and gathering of the cosmic whirlwinds are laid bare the primeval seeds of human being and existence.

E. Lampert.

Love and Marriage—I

No subject excited more attention during the period " between the wars " than marriage and its problems, yet not only do these problems remain, but to them has been added that of the " war marriage," and peace may bring difficulties even more perplexing. In the conviction that a different approach is necessary this paper has been written, although I cannot claim to have done more than indicate some of the factors which ought to be taken into account in attempting a solution.

Why, it may be asked in the first place, has the vast mass of literature already published on this subject been comparatively so unproductive? The answer may, I think, be sought in the disproportionate concentration on the physical aspects of marriage, and on the special problems connected with the physiology and psychology of sex. To say this is not for one moment to minimize the necessity for such knowledge, but the good marriage depends upon far more than mere "compatibility," sexual or otherwise, and can never be achieved solely by instruction in the "facts of marriage" and platitudinous moralizings on "give and take" imparted against a materialistic background. Popularly speaking, we are as far to-day from a true marriage ethic as we were fifty or five hundred years ago, though this does not mean that many marriages are not in a more than worldly sense "successful." But the fact remains that there is still a "marriage problem," and there will continue to be one until the real nature of the marriage union is understood.

Now the ontological basis of marriage is Love; a full understanding therefore of the real nature of Love must be an essential preliminary to, and ground of, any really adequate marriage ethic. This Love is at once of heaven and eternal, and of earth and temporal; it witnesses powerfully to the tragedy of life while bringing great joy to those who experience it; it is in two senses a mystery. There is the literal historical mystery of its latency, and of its rediscovery and reaffirmation nearly one thousand years ago; there is the high analogical mystery of its significant and comprehensive relation to the great Christian mysteries. With the latter Dr Herbert Doms has dealt exhaustively,[1] so it is rather of Love as an historical phenomenon and as related to natural theology that this paper will treat. Indebted though I have been to Mr Charles Williams' writings,[2] I have refrained from defining Love as "Romantic" because, considered ontologically, there must be about it a universality which frees it from any more than nominal association with social or literary tendencies, whether of medieval or later times, to which as part of the apparatus of Criticism the adjective "Romantic" is attached. Defini-

[1] See *The Meaning of Marriage, passim.* [2] Particularly to the chapter "The Theology of Romantic Love" in *He Came Down from Heaven*, and to the paper *Religion and Love in Dante.*

tion is, however, imperative, and in the present context Love (capital L) will always be used in the ontological sense referred to above, as distinct, for example, from the specifically Christian love or *agape*; for other special connotations of the word *philia* and *eros* will always be employed.[1] But to define is not enough: like so much else unthinkingly accepted, marriage is assumed always to involve Love, and there it is left. For this reason alone it is necessary to go to the root of the matter—to discover what in reality Love is. To accept any superficial explanation would only be to invite complications, because for the ordinary man there are differences (often not consciously realized) even in sexual love. The films he sees, the novels he buys, even his poetry—if he reads any—describe an emotion frequently dissociated from marriage: they lead him, perhaps, to the threshold of wedded love, but rarely beyond—unless it be into the complications of a " problem marriage." His manuals on marriage are, on the other hand, anything but " romantic "; they belong to a more practical—sometimes more sordid—world than that of falling-in-love and courtship. There is a hiatus between Love and marriage—a sort of erotic dichotomy.

This dichotomy is partly the result of, and partly in spite of, the historical context of Love: the whole situation is largely taken for granted, like so much else in relations between the sexes, and it is too readily assumed that the " noble and ennobling passion " which is the constantly recurring theme of a great deal of our finest literature, art, and music, is something " natural and universal "—universal, that is, in an empirical rather than an ontological sense. Actually it is nothing of the sort: there is nothing in the poetry and drama of the ancient world equivalent to the *Divine Comedy* or its intended rival, *The Angel in the House*; to *Romeo and Juliet* or *Epipsychidion*. Not even with a developed musical technique at his command can we for

[1] *Philia* is here regarded as the love of mutual friendship displayed principally on the intellectual plane—the love which both gives and receives: *eros* is the selfish love which seeks, and is displayed principally on the physical plane. *Agape*, the love which gives, conditions, and overrules the other two elements, producing, when it is dominant, that complete and mutual self-giving of personality on all planes—spiritual intellectual, and physical—which alone is true Love. Where love (small l) is used it denotes any relationship between the sexes which, although commonly so dignified, is in reality less than that complete and mutual self-giving which Love demands.

one moment imagine a Greek or an Assyrian composing *Tristan und Isolde* or Beethoven's *Sonata Op.* 81*a*. So far from being a "natural and universal" phenomenon, "it is only if we imagine ourselves trying to explain this doctrine to Aristotle, Vergil, St Paul, or the author of *Beowulf* that we become aware how far from natural it is."[1] Integral though Love is to the gospel of Creation, it seems to have remained throughout the greater part of historical time unknown and unsuspected by men. Speculation here upon that remarkable movement which originated in eleventh-century Provence, and upon the source of its distinctive literature, is unnecessary, but from it is clearly derived the whole background to modern man's attitude towards love and marriage. There occurred a fundamental change in sentiment which must be properly evaluated if any complete understanding of the relationship between man and woman is to be reached.

Essentially the movement was a revolt against an attitude towards women and marriage which was almost universal in the ancient world, and had survived with certain modifications as a feature of medieval society. In general, the status and dignity of womanhood in any society and the current valuation of love and marriage react reciprocally upon one another. That Love, in the sense in which it is used here, was almost unknown in early times (and indeed for centuries after the dawn of the Christian era) is clear. Physical attraction there definitely was—even a certain nobility in love, a certain splendid eroticism which sometimes proved to be the soil from which a more glorious flower sprang, an unconventionality in individuals which to a degree redeemed the situation. There was experience of *philia*, analogically even of *agape*, in these natural relationships, though they were exceptional: the love normally experienced—as, for instance, that in the *Song of Songs*—was mainly erotic, though occasionally an element of *philia* entered in. The one exception was among the ancient Egyptians, whose women enjoyed a degree of freedom unparalleled in the ancient world: in consequence, there was practically equality in marriage, and a "romantic" view of love which found expression in the popular poetry,[2] and explains the otherwise unaccountable love of Akhnaton

[1] See C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love*, p. 3.

[2] See *The Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. viii, pp. 181-2.

and Nefertiti.[1] Elsewhere the status of women varied: in the nomadic communities they possessed considerable liberty and relations between the sexes were comparatively free, as is evident from the passionate intensity of erotic feeling which Hebrew and Arabian poetry display. It seems likely that settlement and the development of urban society contributed to a decline in the status of women, whose liberty and equality with men must have been conditioned to no small extent by their usefulness in the community. Another interesting determinative factor seems to have been the merging of two cultures. In Athens, less susceptible to foreign influences, a curious situation obtained: the wife was secluded and treated as an inferior, while the ἑταίρα was admitted to social and intellectual equality with men, although love in the "romantic" sense was unknown. On the fringes of the Greek civilization, on the other hand, literary expression was given to an emotion more closely resembling love; from contact with the East sprang the poetry of Sappho, and from Alexandria came the first romantic novels. But in every case the love described is erotic, and neither in the novels nor in such Theocritan pastoral escapism as the later *Daphnis and Chloe* is there any delineation of that Love which is the activity of the whole person. In Greece, too, the normal erotic factor was perverted by the prevalence of homosexuality, and marriage became a matter of convenience and duty to the State, with children and social position as its objects. Among the Romans an unimaginative and puritanical attitude was in the course of time modified by Greek influence, and a division of feeling is indicated by the opposed cults of Venus Erycina and Venus Verticordia—licentious Love and domestic affection: the "domestic affection" was something less than complete love, while the passion sung, for example, by Catullus and Ovid was erotic, licentious, and frequently adulterous. Indeed, both by Greeks and Romans, sexual love was regarded as somewhat of an abnormality, and there seems to have been no mean between the two extreme views, according to which it was treated either as a madness or a joke—to be presented tragically, satirically, or facetiously as occasion demanded, but never to be taken at its true valuation.

[1] See Weigall, *The Life and Times of Akhnaton* (1922 ed.), especially 116-7, 150, 185-6.

Christianity cannot be said generally to have exerted any profound influence on the situation beyond introducing an element of refinement into sexual relationships. The Fathers, like other good Christians, were after all " of their time," and while acknowledging that women had immortal souls, they usually insisted on their subordination, and seemed unable to appreciate that love is more than sensual gratification, and marriage than an ordinance for procreation and the " pardoning " of sexual desire. The extremes of opinion are well represented by Tertullian's description of women as the " gate of the devil " and " destroyers of God's image,"[1] and Gregory of Nyssa's view that " while the pursuit of heavenly things should be every man's first care, yet if he can use the advantage of marriage with sobriety and moderation he need not despise this form of self-dedication."[2] Clearly this falls short of the ideal implied in St Paul's comparison between marital love and Christ's love for His Church, although the implications of this comparison are not worked out—in fact, could not be worked out, conditions in the ancient world being what they were. And even St Paul shows " little sense of the dignity of Christian wedlock or its potentialities for bringing new virtues to light," but rather a " steady indifference to all that is best—nay, all that is positively good—in marriage. . . ."[3] Elsewhere (Col. iii, 19), the command to husbands—" love your wives," " . . . undoubtedly envisages love in the highest and most Christian sense. But the context as a whole is on a lower plane. When wives are commanded merely to ' be in subjection ' to their husbands and husbands ' not to be bitter against them,' etc. . . . we are regrettably far from the ideal of the Christian household. . . ."[4] Whether these " grudging words " reflect an outlook dominantly eschatological or that exaggerated asceticism so characteristic of the early centuries of the Christian era it is hard to decide. But the general attitude to marriage (and therefore to love) is clear: it may

[1] De cult. fem. i, 1. Admittedly the reference here is to the Eve whom womanhood typifies—" Et Evam te esse nescis ?"—but there is no reference to the New Eve in whom womanhood is restored, nor to her Son through whom mankind has been redeemed from sin. Nothing can justify the unqualified harshness of this and many other patristic references to woman. [2] De virg. 8. [3] Kirk, *The Vision of God*, p. 76. [4] Johannes Weiss, *Das Urchristentum*, pp. 454 *f.*; quoted by Kirk, *ibid.*, p. 77.

be summarized briefly as a recognition that marriage is a natural good, but nevertheless inferior to virginity, and that sexual desire is sinful, and only redeemed when directed towards procreation, although " pardoned " when otherwise satisfied according to the " natural use " and within the marriage union. It is interesting, before leaving this section, to observe two things. There is already evidence of a concentration on the sexual aspect of marriage, which will be found to grow more and more exclusive until it almost dominates later thought: this is unfortunate, though hardly to be wondered at when the Fathers' ignorance of love and the moral conditions of their times are remembered. There is, too, confirmation of the tendency noted before for an undervaluation of marriage to be accompanied by a depreciation in the status and dignity of womanhood. Tertullian, for instance, to whose views of women reference has already been made, could say, " We do not reject matrimony; we only refrain from it."[1] What the views of the ordinary good Christian were we have no means of ascertaining, but we may fairly assume that whilst not so extreme as those of some of the Fathers, they were on the whole representative of their age.

Love is ignored as completely in medieval as in Patristic theory. The Scholastics tended to view love entirely in relation to the sexual act, and attempted to determine, not without complications, the respective elements of good and evil in the act and in the desire and pleasure concomitant with it. Passionate love was found to be evil because of the suspension of rational activity which it was held to involve, and the evil was not mitigated because the object of such love happened to be one's own wife. " In its Thomistic form the theory acquits the carnal desire and the carnal pleasure and finds the evil in the *ligamentum rationis*, the suspension of intellectual activity . . . ," a view, says Mr C. S. Lewis, which suggests " something much less like the purity of Adam in Paradise than the cold sensuality of Tiberius in Capri."[2]

Complementary to this theory was the actual marriage situation in medieval times, with its matches of interest, dissolved as readily as they were contracted—a relationship in which love usually played an insignificant part. And such the situation might have continued. But in eleventh-

[1] Adv. Marc. i, 29.

[2] *The Allegory of Love*, p. 17.

century Provence a new Movement of the Spirit appeared in power—unsuspected, for " the wind bloweth where it listeth "—proclaiming in the borrowed erotico-mystical vocabulary of the Catharist heresy[1] the Love integral to the Gospel of Creation, and glorifying the true foundation of marriage in terms of the adultery to which it must be always essentially and implacably antagonistic. This was the revolution which asserted, against reason, that " passion precisely excited and illuminated the intellect, that it delivered from *accidia*, excited to *caritas*, and even (strangest reversal of all !) could exist as or in marriage. . . . The discovery of a supernatural justice between two lovers was passion's justification, and not only justification, but its very cause. . . . In certain states of Romantic Love the Holy Spirit has deigned to reveal, as it were, the Christhood of two individuals."[2]

The significance of the movement lies, therefore, in the reaffirmation of the reality and importance of Love: its course is a history of reconciliations; it developed in two directions—northward and southward. In its northward trend the emphasis shifted gradually from adultery to marriage, and from love unconsummated to Love consummated. The change is concealed, in the literature of the time, beneath the complications of allegory, and it is sometimes almost imperceptible, though of several interesting stages two may be noted. In the *Romance of the Rose* it is not clear whether a husband is involved or not, and it is certainly irrelevant; a love is described which is not essentially adulterous, even though no consummation is attained. In Chaucer's *Troilus and Cryseide* the love of the hero and heroine and its extramarital fulfilment is celebrated in an epithalamial manner, direct and unallegorical. Finally, Spenser in the *Faerie Queene* gives expression to the recon-

[1] I do not intend here any approval of the historical thesis maintained by M. de Rougemont in his *Passion and Society*. But it seems at least arguable, from the coincidence of Catharism and the Troubadour Movement, that the erotic symbolism of the former was appropriated because, regardless of its original significance, it afforded just that vocabulary needed for the literal description of this new sentiment of Love. This does not postulate any necessary connexion between the Cathars and the Troubadours (though some Troubadours may have been Cathars); it was just providential that at the birth of the new movement there was at hand a vocabulary which could be taken over by its protagonists for the expression of their ideas.

[2] Charles Williams, *The Descent of the Dove*, p. 131.

ciliation between Love and marriage; marriage is at last redeemed. Another reconciliation—between Love and religion—was effected by Dante at the southward extremity of development; its significant moment was the " blessed " salutation of Beatrice, described in the *Vita Nuova*—" 'blessed' because it is beatitude which inspires." In fact, " Dante becomes for one moment in his soul that Perfection which he has observed in Beatrice. . . . She unknowingly communicated to him an experience of *caritas*."[1] To understand all that is implied in this significant moment is to view Love from a new and entirely different angle.

Finally, this account must not end without reference to the works and theory of Coventry Patmore, who emphasized anew the integral connexion between Love and marriage, and asserted, against a certain element in nineteenth-century Romanticism, that Love could and must find its true end and fulfilment in marriage. He was also one of the first to explore thoroughly the analogical significance of Love. His conception of Love has yet to be understood and appreciated as it deserves; in spite of some extravagances, it is full of importance for our own times.

Such, all too inadequately outlined, is the historical background against which modern sexual relationships must be studied: they cannot be regarded as phenomena isolated in time, peculiar to the present-day situation though many of their problems may be. Consideration of this historical background, and the inferences which may be drawn from it, leads to the conviction that these problems need the application (with the assistance, where necessary, of modern psychological and physiological knowledge) of certain perennial and essentially theological principles to which the second part of this paper can do no more than direct attention.

SHERWIN BAILEY.

[1] Charles Williams, *Religion and Love in Dante*, pp. 10 *f.*

The Church and Youth: An Examination Analysis

The problem of school divinity, within the broader context of the Church and youth, is a problem which exercises and must continue to exercise the minds of clergy and laity alike for many years to come. This is not only because school divinity is an extremely difficult subject to teach, and has been neglected and thrust aside as the Cinderella of subjects in many schools, but also because the religious environment in which many children are brought up is defective and wellnigh pagan. The present writer has been asked by otherwise intelligent boys in genuine search of enlightenment "Who wrote the Lord's Prayer?" and, "Wasn't Judas Iscariot the governor of Judæa?" and has even been told by a Cambridge undergraduate who secured good second-class honours in his tripos that Moses was one of the twelve apostles.[1] Indeed, the chief problem confronting the teacher is in reality the problem of the negative environment.

These problems, as well as the broader problem of the Church and youth, can only be properly solved if those who are attempting a solution have some knowledge of the environment and conscious needs and thoughts of the boys and girls concerned. What, in effect, is needed is an ecclesiastical "Mass Observation"[2] or Gallup Survey of "Church and people." In order to obtain something of this kind the present writer included certain questions relating to the Church and the world in the informal terminal examinations of a secondary school. The questions were given to five forms, some hundred boys in all, of ages varying from twelve plus to fifteen plus. An analysis of the answers given is suggestive of the aspirations and ideals, the problems and defects, of youth teaching by the modern Church.

The questions on Scripture were well answered on the whole, and even those who showed no very clear understanding of what lay behind Jesus Christ's teaching rarely

[1] *Cf.* a letter written to *The Times* by Mr Wilfred Hall some years ago: "Moses was 'a discipline in the time of Jesus, and who taught the Christian worship to the people.'" This was an answer from a secondary school, a class of thirty boys of average age of fifteen.

[2] *Cf. Britain by Mass Observation,* Harrisson and Madge (1939).

erred badly on matters of fact. One youth averred that at the Last Supper " they had chicken and tea and many other things," but there were no real howlers. The one suggestive fact which emerged from the group of questions relating to Scripture does, however, concern the Last Supper. Of some twenty boys who were asked to write a short note on the " Last Supper," two boys omitted the question, fourteen gave the chief facts, but only four mentioned the fact that the Communion originated at the Last Supper. It is true that this was a junior form, largely consisting of boys who had not yet been confirmed, not all of whom were members of the Church of England, but the answer is surely symbolic of the discrepancy which perforce exists between the Bible and the world.

There were five remaining questions:

(1) Why do you think people ought to be Christians ?

(2) What do you think the Christian's attitude to war should be ?

(3) What do you think the Christian's attitude to unemployment should be ?

(4) What do you mean by the word " worship " ?

(5) With what problems do you think that the Church will have to deal at the conclusion of the present war ?

(1) The first question was asked of a junior form, but with the possible exception of one boy, who answered, " I am a Christian because I believe in Christendom, and I can see no other reason for being one," a real effort was made by most of the boys to answer the question intelligently. In brief, although all three elements were present in different proportions, the answers ran along the following lines, utilitarian, ethical and theological.

The utilitarian answer was grounded on the well-worn argument: " If you are not a Christian, you will not go to Heaven," or in the answers given by two boys:

" If they weren't, and did not believe in Christ, they would not be saved and would not go to Heaven."

" If men and women were not Christians they would not have anyone to pray to when they were in trouble or when they needed help. Therefore it is advisable to become a Christian."

Perhaps the best answer of this nature was the following:

" If you are a Christian you have something to look forward to in after-life, but if you are a heathen you only dread the end of life. If you are a Christian you feel safe and happy to think

that there is somebody who understands you and knows that you are innocent of anything that you have been accused of which is untrue."

Any discussion with boys reveals the material nature of the heaven to which they think good Christians will go, and is obviously influenced, as indeed it always has been, by the boy's material environment.

The ethical answer was again obviously influenced by contemporary conditions and was, in its essentials, based on the fact that if everyone " was a Christian they would be united and friends, and there would be no wars." There were variations of this type of answer,[1] but it was almost certainly the answer which occurred to most of the boys. The chief sentences from the fullest answer of this kind are as follows:

" People ought to be Christians because if all the people of this great earth were Christians there would be no wars or anything to do with war; everyone would be much cleaner in the sight of God (*sic*). There would be no shortage of food, and peace and quiet would rule instead of toil and burning houses. Another reason is that you could go anywhere, and you would come across hospitality instead of brutality. You could cross the Atlantic in a boat which was commanded by Japanese without fear of mutiny.[2] If everybody were Christians you could perhaps learn other peoples' languages from the actual country without being called a spy, or something different, but meaning the same thing."

The theological answers—that is, those answers grounded on doctrine and belief—were few in number, but they were in general the most satisfactory because they led from belief to action. " People," said one boy, " should believe in God, for He was the person who made this world and created every living thing in it." It should be noted that even now there was no mention of the life and death of Christ. This was doubtless implied in many answers, but in fact only three boys out of thirty actually urged this as a ground of belief. Here are two of the answers:

[1] *E.g.*, " Men and women ought to be Christians because it would make the world a far better and more peaceful place, and everybody would understand and help each other and be more honest, and the rich would help the poor." [2] I need hardly mention that this was written before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan.

" Men and women should be Christian because Jesus laid down His life for them."[1]

" Men and women ought to be Christians because Jesus died on the Cross so that they might be saved and become Christians. They also ought to become Christians out of gratification for the sweet and wonderful things in life."

This analysis suggests plainly that religion is not only less Christocentric than it has been, but that the life and death of Jesus Christ does not touch upon the life of the Christian as it should.

(2) This question on the Christian attitude to war indicated a less belligerently patriotic point of view than one might have expected. One boy urged that " conscientious objectors should be made to join the non-combatant services," but other answers indicated that there was no question of the right of conscience being infringed. One boy submitted that " according to the Bible one should not fight, but submit to the enemy," but added that " if it is not only you who are threatened, surely you should fight to protect your relations and friends." Interestingly enough two boys agreed that " a Christian should first think whether, in his opinion, the war is a just one before taking any part in the war." Another boy said that the Christian should do everything in his power " to help his country to get back into a state of peace once more." Yet another boy added that if everyone was a scout there need be no war, as the scouts are " bound by a bond of friendship," and concluded by saying that, " as Jesus said, every Christian should pray for his and everybody's safety."

A number of answers were suggestive of a feeling that was quite evidently to the fore among many boys, that " a lot of people who pretend to be Christians turn out to be hypocrites." Two boys suggested that " in the old times it was always the Christians that caused the trouble and started war," and that " the Christian people always think that they are right and someone is bound to be wrong." Another boy expressed his ideas in characteristic fashion: " The people who go to church on national days of prayer, and dressed only in their best, do not go because they want to pray, but to hear people say, ' I saw Mrs. X at the church, and she was nicely dressed.' "

[1] He went on to say that " another reason is because it is a decent religion, and we have ample evidence to prove that there is a God in Heaven, even though it is at times hard to believe."

In general, the following answer was almost naturally typical of the attitude of the majority:

"War is definitely not right, but sometimes it is unavoidable. Every Christian has the right to be free, and we are fighting this war for freedom. If we had not gone to war we would not be able to worship God in the Christian way. We would have been oppressed."[1]

(3) The question on the Christian attitude to the unemployed was very revealing, for no question could have displayed the middle-class bias of some of the boys more clearly. While a few boys urged that Christians should "pity and try and help those who are unemployed," and that Christians "should act, not just say how they hate unemployment, as many do," many boys were clearly sceptical of the whole problem. "People," said one boy, "should work for a living and work for other people if they could," and another added that "sometimes the people themselves do not wish to work." Another feared that "they (the unemployed) might stir up trouble, causing civil war," and added truly but inconsequently that "our Lord meant all men to work." "The Christian people," so answered another boy, "who try do not become unemployed a lot because they get a good job and try and keep it." "Man," observed yet another, "should do his daily work or else he would be getting money for doing nothing, and it would be the money of a good loyal citizen, who had to pay it in rates." Another boy summed up the attitude of the class when he said:

"A Christian should be kind to everybody. Some people who are unemployed just don't try to get work, so why should you or I give to them because we are Christians? If they can't get work it is different. The unemployed could be Christians like anyone else. Then they could ask for the help of God. The disciples and Jesus wandered without food or money; they just had faith. Why should the unemployed not be like them? because God will help you if you ask Him and believe in Him."

Only one boy hinted that "there is plenty of food and money in the world for everybody," and that the real problem was the problem of distribution, work and wealth in the light

[1] One curious answer might be mentioned—viz., "People believe that God sends a man on earth to cause a war in order to kill or punish sinful people."

of the teaching of Christ. Quite obviously the Protestant " ethic " about which Weber, R. H. Tawney, Robertson, Fanfani and others have argued has some basis in the twentieth even if not in the sixteenth century.

(4) The question relating to the meaning of " worship," which was given to the most senior of the five forms surveyed, was answered intelligently. Worship, most of the boys said, was " praise of God," " of confirming one's belief in Him, and of delivering one's petitions to Him," " coming into His presence regularly to offer thanks and praise to Him, and ask petitions from Him." A number of boys tried to analyse the component parts of worship, and the most successful answered that:

" worship comprises: (1) intercession, when we pray for aid in our troubles; (2) serving; (3) praying for others; (4) praises. Anyone looking through these points would notice that one of the points is something done outside a church, and this, I think, is the 'hall-mark' of the true Christian."

Another boy said that worship consisted in refreshing one's soul " with deep draughts from the living fountain of love " in order to return to the " everlasting struggle with the money-grabbing and warring instincts of this world." Two or three boys emphasized the necessity for sincerity on the part of the worshipper. " It is better," said one, " to spend one minute of really earnest prayer than to spend half an hour repeating a long jumble of prayers one does not understand and which one does not want to understand." All these answers clearly indicated that many of the boys had grasped some of the essential facts about worship.

Certain other facts emerged from this discussion. In the first place the inadequacy of much worship, more particularly the implied hypocrisy of many church-people, was mentioned in a number of answers. Thus one boy touched on the " late Victorian ideas of worship," which, he said, " seem to be, as long as you attend morning, afternoon and evening services on Sunday for the first twenty years of your life, you have done all the necessary worshipping." Like a few other boys, he said that if one is " pushed or dragged to church," one grows up " to loathe the sight of church."

In the second place, the inadequacy of the Church, or rather of church-people, was brought up in relation to " going to church." Whilst most boys not unnaturally

emphasized that "going to church" was a central factor in true worship, many urged that Christianity and churchmanship were not necessarily identical. One boy answered:

"To most people worship implies going down on one's knees before God, singing hymns and psalms in church, and then going home and saying, 'Well, I've done my worshipping for to-day.' But God can be worshipped without going to church. Worship is really too deep in a person to be expressed in words. People who go to church regularly because it is their duty do not really worship God. A person who goes to church because he feels he would like to go to praise God, even if he only goes once a year, gains more out of it than a person who doesn't really want to go, but goes because it is his or her duty to do so."

The same idea clearly lay in the mind of the boy who upheld those who "preferred to go out in the country and find some quiet spot where they can be alone with their thoughts and nature." "Just because," as another boy summed it up, "you have been to church for every service last Sunday, does not mean that you are a better person."

(5) This last question in one sense provided the most interesting reflection of what one might call contemporary youthful opinion. The question asked, "With what problems do you think the Church will have to deal at the conclusion of the present war?" was capable of being interpreted in many different ways, but, in fact, only a few ideas worthy of mention as typical and representative of the group emerge.

Several boys, rather mistaking the nature of the answer expected from them, emphasized the fact that churches and cathedrals destroyed by bombs, both in England and on the Continent, would have to be rebuilt.

The restoration of the Christian faith in Germany appeared to be the foremost task facing the Church at the end of the war. It was almost taken for granted that Germany was an almost wholly heathen country. One boy suggested that missionaries should be sent to Germany "in the wake of the 'army of liberation.'" Most boys suggested that Hitler was regarded as God, and even as Messiah, by the Germans, and the majority also suggested that the chief problem lay in the conversion of the German youth. As one boy put it, "the new generation will be brought up in the knowledge that there is no God, and if they wish to worship anything, then they must worship their leader,

Adolf Hitler, and Nazism." In view of the paucity of clergy in Germany it was suggested that clergy of other Christian countries should be pooled, and at the conclusion of the war sent to Germany as " to primitive savages " to reconvert the Germans to the Christian faith.[1]

The entry of Russia into the war also constituted a problem for the Christian Church in the post-war years, inasmuch as, like Nazi Germany and China, it was a " non-praying " community. One boy thought that " a Church will have to be started in Russia, not on the old ways, with rich clergy living on the fat of the land and the rest under them, but in fresh lives with the clergy just ordinary folk."

In relation to Britain itself the problem seemed to devolve itself into two tasks. In the first place a surprising amount of attention was given to church attendance, and an emphasis laid in some questions on sabbatarianism. Whilst the boys seemed divided as to whether there had been an increase or decrease in the numbers attending church since the commencement of war, they were clear that the reaction, the need for enjoyment, the release of petrol for Sunday picnics, would cause a diminution in the numbers attending church at the end of the war. It would, said one boy, " be a hard task after the war to try and stop too much enjoyment of Sundays," but he modified this statement by saying that " going out and enjoying oneself on a Sunday is not necessarily wrong providing one does not forget God altogether." " If you go to a picnic," he says, " remember that the place where you are having your picnic was created in the first place by God."

The remedies for this state of affairs, which were recommended in the answers, were very varying in their nature. The Church, said one, must try to counteract irreligion by preaching to the people " what the state of affairs will be like in, say, fifty years if all religion in the country is dropped." Another said:

" The English problem will be quite easy, for the simplest way would be to broadcast every Sunday and to explain how God helped and guided us to victory. The evacuation of Dunkirk, for instance, could never have been completed without God's aid."

[1] One answer dealt with " German Christianity," " A Christian war against Bolshevism." " If the German people get the impression that bloodshed, oppression and tyranny are Christian ways of life, there is much that the Christian Church will have to undo after the war."

A third rather more bluntly urged:

"In wartime many people are busy in the forces, and get a bit slack about church, and after the war, when they are persuaded to go there, an old parson is drivelling on about nothing, and so, I suppose, above all, the Church needs new blood. Not the pale curate type who goes into the Church because he is not good enough for Civil Service, but good, sound men with their hearts in their jobs. I do not see why these men cannot be got, for, after all, it is the service of God and deserves of our best."

In the second place, a number of boys touched on the varying problems relating to the practical side of membership of the Church. Services should be made " more interesting and shorter." " Many people come on National Days of Prayer, but never come again." After the war the Church will have to deal with the Jewish problem, the reunion of the Churches of Christendom, the problems of demobilization and so forth. One boy's answer read:

" With the national ' job ' comes the treatment of the unemployment problem, re-housing in slum areas, and seeing that all the inhabitants of this ' sceptred ' isle have enough to live on; if they have not, let's get rid of the sceptre—rich upper classes, clamping down as much as possible the ideals of the poorer people.

" In the international region we must have a complete spring-clean—cast out all the barriers of false patriotism and hate—for we must forgive seven times seven if we are to ' win the race and get the victor's crown.' "

Finally, a number of boys urged that " if we are not a Christian nation, how can we expect others to be ?" They instanced the general apathy and the plea for revengeful bombing of German women and children, as well as the British treatment of Germany after the last war.

Such an analysis as this, which was certainly of a representative character, may be helpful in two ways. It shows something of the aspirations and ideas of youth in a secondary school, mainly consisting of day boys, between the ages of twelve and a half and fifteen and a half, and even where it reflects the environment and the environment alone, it indicates the interest which these boys have in the problem of the Church, if that interest can only be properly stimulated. Secondly, it is suggestive of some of the defects of our religious training. In the main I let this analysis speak

for itself, but it is clear that there was little understanding of the sacramental nature of the Church nor of the close relationship which must subsist between doctrine and action. There were, in addition, very few references to the implicit social task of the Church. Yet the answers are an encouraging testimony to the interest which youth can take in the Church. It is not, on the whole, very interested in the Bible, but it is, as Mr Edmonds pointed out in a recent article,[1] profoundly interested in discussion, in questions of natural religion, and in social and political action.

Thus we may conclude that the chief task confronting the Church and youth lies in linking up the inseparably important problems of natural religion and social and political ideas in the national and international sphere with scriptural teaching and personal devotion, and in trying to counterbalance the apathetic environment in which, so far as religious matters are concerned, so many boys find themselves.

S. A. C.

Words

Words are the common coin of human communication. They are the means whereby human society exists, for they make possible both understanding and the exercise of power. They are the means either of persuasion or of compulsion, and of the infinite possibilities of human intercourse ranged between these two extremes. That is, words are the instruments of all human effort, whether good or bad, or, more commonly, a mixture of both.

Words are therefore inextricably mingled with human history. It is a very ignorant or else a very mystical view which supposes that words have *in themselves* any generic value or potency, irrespective of their relation to history, or to other words, or of the particular circumstances in which they are used. For instance, words like " bright " or " sweet " have a depth of meaning and radiance of effect which have a quite precise origin. They do not possess these qualities casually or arbitrarily. I think that with patience and scholarly study it could be shown that it was Shakespeare who, above all, charged these two words with their special loveliness, so that when R. L. Stevenson writes:

[1] Theology, Vol. xliii, No. 258, 345-54.

Bright is the ring of words
When the right man rings them,

he is not creating a quite new loveliness with his use of this word " bright "; nor is he depending on an inner mystical magic in the word; but he is depending—with all a poet's sensibility and insight, of course, and poetry is not to be explained merely in terms of the history of words—on a long story and tradition which the word " bright " had gathered round itself from that time when Shakespeare first quickened it into true life in the words of Othello:

Put up your bright swords,
Or the dew will rust them.

Meaning, then, is the basic power and life of words: words *gain* meaning; they are not primarily endowed with it; they acquire life in proportion as they are used in life for living. The real life of words is seen in action. Concreteness is their basis; abstractions are always second-hand, a disguise for words, not their natural clothing.

This view that you cannot dissociate words from meaning might be termed a platitude if the matter were sufficiently thought about to be familiar. In point of fact, words are used, as a rule, in every possible way but that of directly expressing meaning. They are used brutally, and furtively, and meanly, and cunningly, and emptily, and sentimentally; they are overworked and underworked, made to work overtime, and, as Humpty-Dumpty says, not even paid for it; in short, from being the instrument of truth they are commonly degraded to being the myrmidons of force; but like boomerangs they can take their revenge. For misuse of words leads to dullness in words, thence to dullness in thought, thence in all life, and thence ultimately to the decay of the society in which they are misused.

There is one use of words which by opposition points very forcibly their basic connexion with meaning—namely, the pleasant concatenation of musical syllables. This can be seen typically in the poetry of Swinburne, as, for instance, in the *Ode to Liberty*, where, as Professor Grierson once said, you cannot really be sure, apart from the title, that the poem is not in fact addressed to the poet's mistress. The poem sounds very well, but where the meaning is so uncertain the pleasantness of the sounds lacks strength and conviction. Music in words is always subordinate to mean-

ing. In poetry you can have meaning without music and still have good poetry; but you cannot have music without meaning. The poem may be able to fly beautifully for a time, but it is not properly winged; it is just a lovely soap bubble, bound to disappear and leave no trace behind.

If this view is acceptable, we have a guide to appreciating a great deal that is written to-day, and especially the vexed problem of the prose work of James Joyce. Books have been written about his *Ulysses*, and no further elucidation can be attempted here. Professor Daiches, of Chicago, has argued that there really is a strict and comprehensible technique in *Ulysses*;[1] and there is no doubt that Joyce had perfectly well-defined ideas about the presentation of character, and the nature of time, and the use of words. But in the actual execution of the work he gives to words something other than their customary meanings and associations; he tries to give them a new life in a new order of feeling and being, but in doing so he ignores their past history and tradition. *A priori*, therefore, his work is falsely conceived. There are certain things you cannot do with words if you want to keep your sanity, and the chief thing is that you cannot divorce them from their accumulated life in the language.

Granted, then, this basic life for words, it is necessary, if we are to understand and use them aright, that we should be able to distinguish the main ways in which they can be used. These ways are seen most clearly in relation to the *ends* which the writers have in view. In the history of European literature no serious rival has ever appeared to the classical Aristotelian view, that the best end of words, and of all art, is to persuade the hearer or reader. This view does not by any means limit the purpose of art to didacticism, for the attractive and pleasurable element, the "vatic," is a very important part of Aristotle's theory. But even where the pleasure is quite naïvely presented, as in any good lyric which tells of some high emotion, of love or nature or of religion, the poet obviously wants us to have the same emotion or perception; he wants us to share in the new range of associations and ideas which the words give; in other words, he wants to *persuade* us to accept his experience.

In authentic writing three main strains of persuasion

[1] *New Literary Values*, p. 69 *ff.*

may be traced: first the simple and direct, second the metaphysical, and third the mystical. False writing, on the other hand, is the writing which aims not at persuasion, but at compulsion, and while it may seem to be connected with the same strains as authentic writing, it is not truly so. For its end is deceit; its references are forged, and however good its disguise, its sins will find it out, though unfortunately it may have done a great deal of harm before that.

Take first the simple, direct way of using words. You find it at its best in poetry in a writer like Chaucer, and in prose in one like Jonathan Swift. Neither has any ulterior motive; the prose writer gives you " words in the best order," and the poet gives you " the best words in the best order." Both aim at telling you something and persuading you to accept it; Chaucer wants you to relax in the plain good humour and naturalness of his tales, and Swift aims at co-ordinating and arranging facts and ideas for you in such a way that you are led insensibly on to his conclusions. With his political pamphlets he shook governments, with his Drapier letters he influenced very deeply the social history of Ireland, and still to-day, with his clear-sighted simplicity and fierce irony, as in *Gulliver's Travels* or the *Tale of a Tub*, he can direct you to a sense of the permanent in human things, and especially in human folly.

But notice this interesting fact: the truest simplicity is not primitive; you do not find a child or a savage being simple in their thought in this way. On the contrary, children and savages are the most subtle and elusive and complicated in their associations of thought. This simplicity of Chaucer and Swift is *achieved*; it is not natural. Natural simplicity is found in what we call colloquialism; but this has only a limited application, for it depends on a narrow circle or coterie of friends or companions who share the same jargon. (It is a question for discussion if a large part of modern poetry is not really an elaborate form of colloquialism, a kind of shorthand which needs elucidation by those who hold the key. I think, for instance, of T. S. Eliot's *Waste Land*, which for all its power and importance remains largely obscure, and as Mr Eliot himself says in his notes, must be understood by reference to a certain book, *From Ritual to Romance*.) But we must understand that when a writer or a speaker is simple and direct he is so only by the most laborious and praiseworthy effort; he reaches simplicity by a wealth of thought and study and

allusion; meaning emerges as the prize of his work. It is never simply a bolt from the blue.

When this is true of what we call simple and direct writing, how much more true it must be of other kinds. What I call metaphysical writing depends for its effect on the acceptance by writer and reader of a body of facts or ideas, which are not directly treated, but are assumed throughout. The group of poets whom Dr Johnson called the Metaphysicals may sometimes seem to serve obscurity rather than meaning. But in general, and in particular in the poetry of John Donne, persuasive power is due to an allusive appeal to certain experiences and facts which carry great weight in themselves; and, further, the poet refers, in an argumentative way, to possibilities of thought which range far beyond the particular experiences he is recounting. (A particular illustration may be found in a poem like Donne's " Extasie.") The true appeal of metaphysical writing lies in the further range of the writing. If you are ignorant of, or hostile to, the body of facts or experience or the climate of thought, which the writer presupposes or accepts, then you cannot truly share in his meaning. It is a very important part of understanding, therefore, to know what a writer assumes, to know what his background is, and to know what he really aims at. To take a classic example, Dante's *Divine Comedy* can certainly be understood by a non-Christian reader, but only by the most discerning exercise of imaginative sympathy will he be able to trace his way through the high argument, and so reach with some satisfaction the lofty and wonderful conclusion, where Dante recounts his vision of the ultimate peace of the universe. Indeed, the meaning of Dante is so vastly extended, and so profound, that it may justifiably be doubted whether any but believers in the same way can share his meaning to the full.

To take a much more trivial example: out of my own experience with sermons I am often very forcibly reminded of the difficulty of using words with true precision and persuasion, when I work out what seems to me to be a very important point; it might be, for instance, the relation of Christian principles to patriotism, or the place of suffering in the human scheme. I find my ideas getting assembled round some crucial point, and for me there emerges some sort of luminosity, within whose glow other problems become more endurable; and then, hey presto, I talk with

someone the next week, or I listen to what someone is thinking, and I see they do not accept the same framework. They work by different assumptions, the climate of living is quite different for us both; they have therefore picked on something quite trivial so far as my argument was concerned, they have found substantiation for some prejudice or superstition or even a diametrically opposed view of patriotism or what suffering means, and all my work is shown to be void.

To take another example still, this time an example of misapplied metaphysics, of false writing. The ideas of blood and race are very powerful and wonderful ones: the intimate connexion of people through the ages, bound in a common fate, sharing the same history and the same land, speaking the same tongue, and understanding one another in a full way denied to outsiders. All this can be found truly and freshly expounded in the novels of a writer like D. H. Lawrence, and in lesser ways in many others. But when you turn to a writer like Alfred Rosenberg, or to the speeches of Adolf Hitler, you find that the aim is not clearly presented, but it is distorted by all manner of other evil things; and the consequence is that these powerful and important strains in human life and understanding have been falsified. Words are not used by Hitler with true persuasive appeal, but with unexamined, emotional content, in such a way that they are not allowed to persuade by their own luminosity. What St Thomas called "claritas," what we might call persuasive radiance, has been evacuated, and the appeal is directed to the baser elements in the hearers. This is the nadir of false rhetoric; and unfortunately it is far more common than might at first appear. I know it again in personal experience; preachers and politicians are specially prone to it. It is easily written; it rolls glibly off the tongue and streams facilely from the pen. It does not pierce, but it stirs the complicated pool of passions and desires which for most men make up their conscious life: it might be by an eloquent repetition of certain heavily charged words like "democracy," or "love," or "constructing a better world"; it might be by means of many other hypnotic suggestions; but in all cases it is a perverse and dangerous misuse of words.

Closely allied to the metaphysical use of words there is the third strain—the mystical. By this I mean the use of words to interpret an experience which is not directly

intelligible, and which therefore lies outside the normal beat of words. The line between this and the false metaphysical or deceitful use of ideas and desires for perverted ends is very narrow; but it is quite clear, all the same. Here the end may be obscure, but it is not hidden by the writer deliberately, as the false rhetorician hides it; it is hidden because the words strain to catch a depth or range of meaning which they have never had before. This is where the purest poetry and the loftiest thought use words with fresh creative power. This is the climax of human handling of words, and also the source for giving words that history in human society which has been analyzed above. This is where words are both given a soul and clothed with beauty. It should be clear, therefore, that by the word " mystical " is not intended only the work of a religious poet like Richard Crashaw, who subdues to the service of his passionate, colourful experience all manner of strange images, so that jostling in his poetry many strange companions can be found. But here, rather, are meant all those poems in which new overtones are created, new associations of words, new beauty, not expressed so much as indicated and not always in musical sounds, but often in deep and perplexed pools of darkness; here is added:

> the gleam,
> The light that never was, on sea or land,
> The consecration, and the Poet's dream.

Here are meant all those poems which leave us dissatisfied, and longing, and wondering; which may open to us new worlds of imagination and understanding. For myself I should think here of parts of Wordsworth's *Prelude*, of great stretches of the Elizabethan dramatists, of Manley Hopkins:

> O the mind, mind has mountains; cliffs of fall
> Frightful, sheer, no-man-fathomed,

and again, of many smaller poems, and especially poems of observation of nature, which by their precision and truth succeed in revealing, rather than stating and holding new worlds: glimpses of order and beauty. Thus Edward Thomas in *The Hollow Wood*:

Out in the sun the goldfinch flits
Along the thistle-tops, flits and twits
Above the hollow wood
Where birds swim like fish—
Fish that laugh and shriek—
To and fro, far below
In the pale hollow wood.

It is in this way that we may understand that "poetry is the first and last of all knowledge; it is as immortal as the heart of man." For the best poetry—to return to Coleridge's homely definition—is that which uses the best words in the best way, and that is an achievement which is joined to all that is best and most enduring in human society. Even to-day, attacked as we are on every side by various sentimental, emotional, unexamined, propagandist, and deceitful uses of words, it is still possible to find order and sanity and beauty in the honest and thoughtful use of words by true poets. It is not only possible, it is an imperative necessity, if human society is not to be utterly poisoned by insincerity and by the prostitution of words by those who seek power rather than truth.

RONALD GREGOR SMITH.

Editorial Notes

THEOLOGY says a loud Amen to the retiring Archbishop's appointment of Dr Lowther Clarke to an honorary canonry in the Metropolitan Cathedral of Canterbury.

The May number will include the Dean of Lichfield's broadcast on "The Old Archbishop and the New," an article by Dr Demant on Vol. I of Reinhold Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures, and a letter from Dr K. E. Barlow with reference to the review of *An Introduction to Christian Social Doctrine* which appeared in the February number.

MISCELLANEA

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REVISED REVIEWS—XIV

Justification and Reconciliation. By Albrecht Ritschl. Vol. 3. The Positive Development of the Doctrine. Eng. Trans. 1900.

The respectability of the prosperous pervades this book. In reading it one can recapture the climate of opinion in which it was written. The world was very sure of its progress and of its ability to advance further towards its goal of civilized culture, pretty certain that, though there would be changes, there would be no crises. For mankind was moving smoothly and inexorably towards the conquest of nature, and education would remove all obstacles from the path. Anything dramatic in the flow of history was regarded as indecorous.

Ritschl's system of theology permits of no extravagances or raptures. And it is not only man's activities which are thus circumscribed, for also God Himself, if one may so express it, is limited by *bourgeois* conventions. Thus we shall not find anywhere in this book the term " Act of God " or any other which implies the irruption of eternity into time or of God's intervention in history. The wonder and the radiance, the exaltation and the joy of St Paul—and of Luther—are lacking in Ritschl. The Wrath of God and the Holiness of God find no place in his system; and it is characteristic that—if I may trust to my memory in the absence of an index—the Resurrection is not mentioned above ten times in these 670 pages. Christianity is respectably prosaic.

Inevitably, the doctrine of Christ is affected. Jesus appears

to be a purely historical figure. He slips into the stream of history, like any other human figure, without causing a ripple. Like other great men He altered the course of that stream by His life. And then He died. This volume provides no evidence as to whether Ritschl believed in the Resurrection or in what manner he interpreted it. So far as I can judge, he would have said that Christ's life ended when He died; and just as he refuses to enter into the question of the pre-existence of Christ, so he sees no need to carry the story beyond the Cross. Christ fits neatly into history; that there is anything disruptive and unpliable about Him is not conceded.

The Johannine emphasis upon the sending of the Son by the Father has escaped Ritschl's attention. The Jesus whom he depicts is the final revealer of God. " The religious value attached to the prophets and their words both by themselves and their countrymen is this, that they are accounted the instruments or organs of the self-revelation of God. In no way different is the estimate put by Jesus upon Himself, save only that the essential and ultimate Divine purpose, which Jesus is conscious not only of explaining in word but of realizing in deed, involves His placing His own independent personality in a still closer relation to God His Father " (p. 435). He was not, like the prophets, part-time revealers, so to speak, for there was no aspect of His life and character which was not directed to this purpose. But He is Christ because He set His will so to devote Himself. And the Christ might have been someone else. It is not unthinkable that there could be another, and he would be inferior only in time. " If a second could be produced who, really, was on a level with Christ in grace and truth, in world-conquering patience, in scope alike of purpose and of achievement, he would yet stand in historical dependence upon Christ and, therefore, logically, would be subordinate to Him " (p. 465).

He died for our sins and was raised for our justification, said St Paul. For Ritschl, Christ's death was the supreme test of His life. He lived that we might be forgiven. " Christ's death, as it must be explained by His previous obedience, is, in the view of the Apostles, the summary expression of the fact that Christ maintained His religious unity with God and His position as the Revealer of God throughout the whole course of His life " (p. 543). Had He died in old age the world would lack the supreme example of the steadfastness with which He followed His vocation; but that is all that it would lack. Ritschl makes no attempt to fit into his theology such a statement as " Him, being delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye by the hand of lawless men did crucify and slay; whom God raised up " (Acts ii, 24).

Justification and reconciliation are rather a posthumous legacy than a living gift. " Because Christ kept Himself in the love of God by His obedience even unto death, God's forgiving

love is thereby secured beforehand to those who belong to Christ's community." It is difficult to feel that Christ plays any part in the procuring of your salvation and mine save in having formed, 1900 years ago, that community in which alone justification is to be found. It is true that Ritschl from time to time protests against the adoption of this view, but the impression remains. Such a protest is found on page 608. "While it is only as a member of this community that the individual becomes assured of his reconciliation with God and his Divine sonship, this connexion does not serve as a means to that spiritual acquisition in such a way as to render superfluous his conscious subordination to Christ as the Reconciler; on the contrary, the conviction of faith in Christ, within the community which shares the same faith, is the permanent form of the individual's reconciliation and Divine sonship, in the sense that the community both is the medium of our clear remembrance of Christ, and in spite of all defects of knowledge and of religious and moral practice, exerts an impulse to the religious estimate of self which corresponds to the specific action of Christ." We may, perhaps, be pardoned if our doubts are not allayed.

The rôle of the Kingdom of God is consonant with the respectability which runs through the book: it is a utilitarian role, aiding the progress of mankind towards dominion over nature. "A universal ethical Kingdom of God is the supreme end of God Himself in the world" (p. 451). "In Christianity, the idea of the universally human, moral Kingdom of God is posited as the final end of the world in such a way that all the natural and particular conditions of human fellowship are transcended, and humanity is raised above the world as a spiritual totality" (p. 503). Believers occupy that position of supremacy over the world which constitutes eternal life. This is not to say that Christians are free of the "laws of nature," but they rise superior to the pains and stresses of the world. "I do not know that there is any view of the world which attributes a higher value to individual human life or any form of life of a social kind which offers a more adequate satisfaction to the universal human endeavour to transcend the natural limitations of spiritual existence" (p. 504).

Bourgeois complacency is also perceptible in Ritschl's doctrine of Sin. There is no such thing as Original Sin, but "by an unrestrained repetition of selfish resolves there is generated an ungodly and selfish bias." "Neither *a priori* nor yet in accordance with the conditions of experience is it to be denied that there may be a sinless development of life." Sin is that which runs counter to the recognizable moral end of the world. In so far as it can be forgiven and is not a final and settled opposition to God, sin is ignorance. For the love of God, in justifying and reconciling the sinner, treats him as one who can be educated out of his sin. "In so far as men, regarded as sinners both in

their individual capacity and as a whole, are objects of the redemption and reconciliation made possible by the love of God, sin is estimated by God, not as the final purpose of opposition to the known will of God, but as ignorance " (p. 384).

Justification and reconciliation have the effect of setting the sinner's will into accord with the purpose of God. God pardons because He is more than Lawgiver; He is also Love. Since His end is always the establishment of the moral Kingdom of God He cannot rest content with upholding the Law and punishing the wrong-doer, for to pardon the wrong-doer does more towards the establishment of the Kingdom than does punishment. " The attribute of God as Founder and Ruler of His Kingdom is absolutely superior to His attribute as Lawgiver " (p. 92). " In so far as justification is viewed as effective, it must be conceived as reconciliation of such a nature that while memory, indeed, preserves the pain felt at the sin which has been committed, yet at the same time the place of distrust towards God is taken by the positive assent of the will to God and His saving purpose " (p. 85).

While much of Ritschl's theology was coloured by contemporary world views, much of it was also set in deliberate opposition to current theological beliefs. Of these, the most distasteful were Pietism and Mysticism. It may be that temperament as well as study determined his antipathy, and that he not only thought their opinions ill-founded, but also considered their behaviour ill-bred; but his strictures were justified. The Pietists were intensely individualist and overmuch concerned with an inward feeling of assurance of salvation. Religion is not a matter of the emotions, but of the will, and apart from the community there is possible neither the hearing of the Gospel nor the practice of the Christian virtues. In many respects the Pietists had moved far from both Biblical and Reformation theology, and their morality was not always above reproach. Ritschl deprecated, too, what Hort was later to term " Jesus worship." He maintained that faith in Christ, which is necessarily a kind of obedience, is more Biblical than love to Christ, for love implies the equality of the person loving with the beloved. " In the Latin Middle Ages people purchased, by the verbal confession of Christ's Godhead, freedom to love Him as a mere man, to imitate Him as such, to bring Him down to their own level, to play with Him " (p. 594). Such devotion had no place in the Reformed Churches. " For what is sought in this way is merely æsthetic enjoyment, and not religious strength, which as such we prove by indicating our reconciliation with God through our attitude to the world."

Ritschl's emphasis upon the community was a valuable element of his teaching. " Even the Evangelical Christian's right relation to Christ is both historically and logically conditioned by the fellowship of believers: historically, because a man

always finds the community already existing when he arrives at faith, nor does he attain this end without the action of the community upon him; logically, because no action of Christ upon man can be conceived except in accordance with the standard of Christ's antecedent purpose to found a community" (p. 549). Yet it would be difficult to give an account of his positive doctrine of the Church. Negatively, it was not to be like the Roman Church, not to be a legal organization, and at one point he paraphrases St Paul, "Let him who has a particular Church be as him who has none," and at another point he writes: "Preaching is a legal institution of the Church, incongruous, therefore, with the spiritual and inward nature of the union of believers with Christ expressed in the notion of His Kingdom. We conceive the community of believers as the subject by which the Divine Word is proclaimed, without thinking of any special office for the discharge of this task."

Ritschl was convinced of the necessity of returning to the Bible. For in much of the contemporary Christianity, Orthodoxy, profession of "The Faith", had ousted faith in Christ, and Augustine and Thomas and less Christian thinkers overshadowed St Paul. The vitality of the Reformation was decaying, and the faults of legalism and Judaism were creeping back. Only assiduous and scholarly searching of the Scriptures, checked by reference to the Reformers, could revive true Christianity.

No summary can do justice to this book, and a brief treatment is bound to be less than fair. Moreover, it is not easy in these times to write of a book which breathes a certain complacency. It is doubtful whether Ritschl has much to say to this generation. We may, however, learn the danger of allowing current secular preconceptions to colour our presentation of theology. The style forbids popularity. The argument is carried forward rather by momentum than by art. Very rarely does he reach a sort of eloquence, and only in the last chapter is this at all sustained, where, *e.g.*, he writes wisely of the essential relationship between prayer and thanksgiving, and writes with simplicity. One can scarcely say that he illuminates all that he touches, for illumination is not a term which naturally springs to mind when reading Ritschl; but perhaps one can say that he gives a jolt to all that he touches, revealing whether or no it was firmly founded and rightly placed and soundly constructed. And this is no mean achievement.

F. C. Synge.

DEAN STANLEY AND *The Christian Year*

I have been asked to write a few words about a little-worn copy of *The Christian Year* which I have given to Pusey House. I thought it worth preserving because it seems to me to provide

a touch of human interest in the atmosphere of raging controversy which disturbed Oxford during the Oxford Movement.

The book belonged to Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, afterwards Dean of Westminster, who was a figure at the time of the Movement. He was my uncle, and I knew and loved him very dearly. When he came to Oxford the controversies had begun, and coming from the dominant influence of Arnold he threw himself into opposition to the Movement. But his mind was really quite alien to questions of theological controversy. It is not too much to say that they really meant nothing to him. His faith was like the faith of a child, and he could not understand making it the subject of abstract intellectual definitions. He knew the truth by faith, just as he knew his mother. And definition was as unreal as a scientific analysis of his mother's character would have been. Religious truth was to him so much bigger and more real than could be expressed by definition.

But I think that it had something to do also with the curious limitations which went with his unique and brilliant gifts. He had no sense of taste or smell, and I don't think any of his senses moved him at all. Beauty in itself made very little appeal to him. He loved seeing new places, but scenery only appealed to him if it had in it some human association, and that he was extraordinarily quick to discover. Arithmetic was totally beyond his comprehension. His brother-in-law, Fred Locker, used to say, "Arthur can never grasp the difference between eighteen pence and one and eightpence." There is a story which illustrates admirably his incapacity to grasp theology. One Trinity Sunday at Westminster a friend said to him, "I have always been puzzled by the doctrine of the Trinity." "Oh, it is quite simple," he answered. "I am just going to preach about it. Come and listen." So they went into the Abbey, and the Dean gave one of those vivid pictures of Athanasius and the Great Council which no one could give like him. The men and the times were brought to life again. When they came out of the Abbey his friend said, "That was magnificent, but you said nothing about the doctrine of the Trinity." The Dean was quite bewildered and couldn't understand what he meant.

I have known only one other man who seemed to have the same incapacity to grasp theological definitions and that was my beloved Canon Alexander Nairne. But in his case it arose from something quite different. He could have understood abstract things, but he had a mental repulsion from the idea of defining spiritual truth. He had the mind of an artist and the beauty of truth was what appealed to him. To define it seemed to him to vulgarize it. Just as a scientific description would have vulgarized the beauty of a sunset. With Stanley definitions meant nothing at all in relation to faith, just as they mean nothing to a child.

But anything that touched humanity he could understand.

Faith he could recognize; spirituality filled him with awe and reverence. When he saw these he took for granted that what the men who had them knew by faith was what he knew. He could not conceive of there being two truths that faith could know. And if they chose to express opinions and definitions about them, that was just an intellectual weakness which in no way limited the reality of their faith. His lectures on the Scottish Church illustrate this very well. When he is showing the grotesque absurdities into which the Covenanters were led, he describes them with a tender affectionate humour through which you can see his love and reverence for their faith and sincerity. That was what gave him such immense width of sympathy and with it an appeal to men of all types of thought which was almost unique. It was that, too, which made him fly with sparkling chivalry to the rescue of men who were condemned as heretics. He believed in their faith and thought little of their opinions. Just as it would have made him think no less that his mother was beautiful because he was told of some fault in the perfectness of her features.

So we come back to the little-worn copy of *The Christian Year* because its very existence illustrates him. He bought it in 1833 when controversy was at its hottest. It was no matter to him that Keble was associated with the Movement which he was combating. In Keble he saw faith and spirituality, and they moved him to awe and reverence. The little book expressed to him that faith and reverence, and so he read it on every day for which a poem was provided, Sunday by Sunday, Feast by Feast, for just on fifty years till his death. The sight of him reading it was familiar to me in my young days. No doubt if he had ever thought of judging it critically he would have seen its great inequalities. But he did not judge it. It was outside criticism. In it he heard Keble speaking to him, the beloved voice of the man who had so high a place in his Calendar of Saints. I remember his visiting Hursley in his later years. I can hear now the tone of awe and reverence with which he spoke of him. So I think the little book is worth preserving, and I hope from time to time there may be some who may see in it a suggestion for grounds of fellowship in days of controversy.

WINDSOR. ALBERT BAILLIE.

SELL THAT THOU HAST

THE real struggle behind the present war is between some form of Nazism and some form of Communism. Capitalism is moving towards its end. Under neither of its competitors, in an extreme form, would the Church—considered as an institution—be permitted to exist. But how far will she be permitted to do so even under a modified form of either system?

Since the reopening of hostilities after a twenty-one years' armistice I have had somewhat unique opportunities of meeting men and women in all walks of life. A very large majority of them not only have nothing to do with any form of institutional religion, but hold it in open contempt, while at the same time professing—and, I am sure, honestly professing—to have the highest regard for our Lord and His teaching. For this contempt they advance two main reasons. The first is—and from their point of view this is an illogical one—the fact that she is " supporting the war "; though on this point I have nothing to say at present. It is their second reason for despising the Church on which I want to concentrate. It is this—that the Church's institutional life is bound up with and dependent upon the very system which, in one way or another, these men and women are determined shall never rule the world again. The Church, they say, possesses such a tremendous vested interest in the industrial and economic resources of the world, and of this country in particular, that her whole influence is bound to be a reactionary one. Most of them, indeed, would go further and state that the Church's financial possessions are in complete contradiction to the principles which their meagre knowledge of Christianity and of the New Testament tells them are the fundamental Christian ones. A great many of them are hazy about details and misinformed in other respects. But in general this is the bed-rock foundation of their indifference, or even their opposition, to the Church to-day. And I believe that if the Church ignores this fact she will do her cause infinite harm.

There are, of course, within the Church growing numbers of people who do recognize this fact. We can be thankful for Malvern, and for the recent report issued along the same lines. But can we be sure that the extreme urgency of the problem is recognized even among such people?

The Malvern Conference carried, *nemine contradicente*, the following resolution:

" (15) In our present situation we believe that the maintenance of that part of the structure of our society, by which the ultimate ownership of the principal industrial resources of the community can be vested in the hands of private owners, may be such a stumbling-block. (Sc. from Res. 14: " Those features of our existing society which, while they can never prevent individual men and women from becoming Christian, are contrary to divine justice, and act as stumbling-blocks, making it harder for men to live Christian lives.") On the one hand it may deprive the poorest members of the community of the essentials of life. (Not only " may," but " does."—R. H. Le M.) On the other hand, while these resources can be so owned, men will strive for their ownership for themselves. As a consequence, a way of life founded on the supremacy of the economic motive will remain, which is contrary to God's plan for mankind.

For one or both of these reasons the time has come for Christians

to proclaim the need for striving towards a form of society in which, while the essential value of the individual human personality is preserved, the continuance of these abuses will be no longer possible.

Members of the Church of England, clergy and laity alike, cannot take part in this work unless they are ready to advocate and bring about a complete change in the internal financial position of the Church of England." (Italics mine.)

In *Malvern and After*, p. 15, the continuation committee states: "A system in which there is a distinct 'money interest' apart from the interest of producers or of the community as a whole inevitably tends to fall under the condemnation of usury. Such a distinct 'money interest' is based upon the conception of money as a commodity, to be regarded as 'wealth.' But money is not wealth. It is a means of exchanging goods and services; and it is a means of storing potential productive power."

Earlier in the same report, on p. 13, one section is headed, "Far-Reaching Changes in the Present System of Land Ownership are Required."

This is all to the good, if it is not thought that the passing of such resolutions means that we can adjourn any effective action *sine die*. The Church of England is undoubtedly creating her own stumbling-block by her possession of enormous shares in industrial resources. She uses her money as a commodity to make more money for her. She invests it where it will earn the greatest interest combined with reasonable safety. She thus draws money from enterprises which should be spent on increasing the material well-being of the workers. She is wedded to capitalism. Small wonder, then, that so many turn from her as they press on to reform in one direction or another!

What is true of the Church as a whole is true also of every society formed within her ranks. As soon as possible funds are invested for carrying on the work of financing the organization. Their money becomes a commodity. The poverty even of our religious orders changes from the unsettled, insecure, pioneering poverty of those who would live on faith—whether this includes the alms of the faithful or not—into the secure, if small, interest payable at the expense of somebody else. For every penny taken in interest keeps the material well-being of the worker at a lower level. Indeed, one man's way of putting it has a degree of justification when he called the Church a parasite on the nation's evil financial system.

To adopt a more personal note: how can I, for example, go to a certain man in my parish and invite him to "come to church" when I know—and he knows—that the pitiful smallness of his meagre pension is due, at least partly, to the fact that the railway company for which he worked must pay my stipend first?

It is because of such things that I believe the tinkering with the internal financial arrangements of the Church—as envisaged, for example, in such books as *Men, Money and the Ministry*, or *Putting our House in Order*—ineffective and even dangerous,

because it leads men's thoughts away from the real problem. It is as if a farmer should occupy himself with improving the irrigation system on his farm, when all the time the river from which the water comes is poisonous. No amount of economy in administration, redistribution of clerical incomes or any other kind of financial reform will be of the slightest use while the source of such money remains what it is, tainted. If this problem of the source is tackled and solved, other things will follow.

What, then, is the solution? Let the Church apply to herself the commandment of our Lord to the rich young man: *Sell that thou hast.* Let her get rid of her vested interests, in whatever concerns they may be. Let her sell her stocks and shares, and turn them into cash. And so let her separate herself from the vicious system which has deprived so many people of any kind of a free life, which oppresses nations and individuals alike, and which is probably the greatest war-producing factor in the modern world. Let her live *on* her capital, not *by* her capital.

I believe that only a strong, drastic and dramatic action such as this will convince the world of the Church's penitence, sincerity and honesty. It will at one stroke sever the Church from the evil world. It will set her over against the world in the clearest contrast. She will then appear as a body dying to the world and its ways, in the world but not of it, issuing a challenge to the world with crystal-clear purity.

After all, is such a solution so drastic, so beyond the bounds of possibility? If the Church does not voluntarily give up her vested interests they will soon be taken from her in any case, with or without compensation. I cannot envisage any Government in this country in, say, ten years' time permitting the Church to hold her possessions unless—which God forbid!—that Government is a Nazi one and the Church has made the ultimate compromise with it. But between the two methods of losing her interests lies a whole world of difference. What would be the effect of a bold surrender such as I have outlined above?

It would mean that, at the present rate of expenditure, the Church would have about twenty-five years to live as an institution. And then, what? If, during that time, she has failed to convince the world of her integrity, of the otherworldliness of her Gospel; if in that time she has not roused the faithful to pay for what they are supposed to value: then let the institution come to an end. The Spirit of God will find another. For new wine must be put into new wineskins. I firmly believe that such a step would prove to be the one thing essential for creating a new dynamic throughout the whole Body of Christ.

No doubt it will mean a drastic cutting of expenditure. No doubt some at least—if not all—of her clergy will have to minister to their necessities with their own hands and to the faithful only when the day's work is done. No doubt her sphere of influence—for what it is worth—will contract considerably for a time. But

the Church would then find herself in a familiar, congenial atmosphere. She would then resemble the Church as portrayed in the New Testament, compelling attention from those who are at present politely indifferent or even hostile to her message, ready to be crucified and thus fill up that which is lacking in the afflictions of Christ. Above all, she would once more be congruous with her Head, who hung naked on the Cross because He would not compromise with the world's system of His day. And, if persecution came, as well it may in any case, she would once more produce heroes and martyrs of the faith, instead of good citizens of the world slightly tinged with Christian sentiments.

I believe that, whatever the future brings, this choice is being forced upon the Church. One thing seems inevitable: she will have to get on without her vested interests in the very near future. Will the Church, then, face the issue and decide *now*, before the choice is made for her? Is not this the best " complete change in the internal financial position of the Church of England " of which the Malvern Conference speaks? Will the Church rise to it?

Whatever the answer, I am at least thankful that I have been allowed to raise the issue.

R. H. Le Messurier.

ABSENTEE LANDLORDS

Communicated

Malvern and After, " The Report of the Committee of Industrialists and Economists with Theologians on those parts of the Malvern Report, especially Sections (19) to (25), on which further comments were desired by the Malvern Conference," makes the following statement under the heading: " 5 (d) Far-reaching changes in the present system of land ownership are required ":

" Occupying serviceable ownership is a prerequisite of any ethically sound land system. Absentee landlordism and non-serviceable ownership are contrary to a morally sound system."

The following account of a small family property may help some readers to visualize the problem more clearly from a concrete example. The writer is a trustee and derives a very small benefit from his share of the small rents.

The farms are situated in a hilly district of Northern England and, being exposed to severe gales, need continual repair. They have been in the family for about 150 years, and were acquired and kept in good order, by the strictest economy on the part of owners, whose standard of living for most of the time was on a level with that of the tenants. A recent valuation for probate fixed the value at £6,000. In the ten years 1931-1940 the

tenants paid £3,322 in rent, repairs cost £1,087, other outgoings £370, leaving £1,765 for the owners, out of which £688 went in Property Tax deducted at the source.

Now let us suppose that the owners, being earnest Christians, think that they ought to disregard sentimental considerations and sell the farms. What would be their contribution to a new and better order? How would the country benefit by their action? The property would have to be sold, for trustees are not authorized to give things away. The purchasers would fall into one or other of these classes.

(*a*) *The tenants*, who would probably borrow the purchase money from the bank on the security of the farm, and for many years would be paying more in interest than they are now paying in rent. They would be placed in a difficult position when unexpected repairs became necessary; certainly the change would be unwelcome to them.

(*b*) *Private individuals not farming the land themselves.* This merely transfers the "guilt" to others.

(*c*) *The State.* Whitehall does not wish to acquire land of this description. The Inland Revenue officials have always refused, even under a Labour Government, to accept land at the probate valuation in payment of estate duties. It is reasonably certain that if the State changed its policy the cost of administration would be higher than now. To remedy a sentimental grievance, the overhead expenses of the national productive effort would be increased.

The County Council might be authorized to buy land without the present restrictions. But in justice to the ratepayers it could not be so generous to the tenants as private landowners generally are.

(*d*) *Semi-public corporations* might buy, such as an Oxford or Cambridge College. They are good landlords, both from motives of public spirit and because they are not handicapped by the necessity of paying periodical estate duties. But is the Christian to encourage the extension of absentee landlordism?

It is difficult to see who benefits by the sale except the present owners, who can exchange a burdensome and precarious investment for a safe one guaranteed by the State. At present their income is about 3 per cent. on the value of the property *and they share the risks*. In the name of Christianity they are invited to change to a form of usury which gives security without risk. The moral theologians of the Middle Ages would have been shocked.

The currents of change are flowing so strongly that probably landlordism of the type described is doomed. But what have such changes to do with Christianity?

CORRESPONDENCE

WOMEN CHURCH WORKERS

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

Miss Newby's article which appeared in the pages of your March number is peculiarly welcome both because of the urgency of the problem with which it deals, and also because of the emphasis laid by her upon proper financial provision being made for those women who wish to give their services to the Church in a professional capacity.

No one who has had anything to do with women Church workers would ever imagine that the Church authorities or the women workers themselves think that salaries are necessary which would make a luxurious standard of life possible, but there is a great gulf between the standards for which present salaries now allow and anything approaching those which would be the result of high rates of pay, as they are commonly understood by the world at large. If the licensed lay worker of whom Miss Newby speaks in her article is to give her best work, it is essential that she should have such financial security as will enable her to give her work freely, without being haunted by the ever-present spectre of not being able to meet this or that necessary expenditure. Some of us were deeply concerned at a discussion held amongst women workers of one diocese on domestic matters, which revealed the really grave difficulty which many workers have of meeting even the normal expenses of food, heating and lighting, and a minimum of necessary service, on their present salaries. It certainly occupies far too prominent a position in their minds because of its urgency.

Very often the world criticizes the woman worker, and for many years she has been the butt of so-called comic stories and remarks concerning her appearance and character. This is not yet a thing of the past, and how often do we stop to ask ourselves: "Is this not due to the appallingly low standard of pay which makes it impossible for her to meet her fellow-workers in secular professions on a level of equality?"

At a recent conference between Church workers and clergy, the clergy expressed themselves determined to make a strong move in favour of reasonably good salaries for all licensed workers in the diocese from which they came, and we hope very much that they will table a resolution on this matter for the next Diocesan Conference. This is a move in the right direction, as it shows that those who should be leaders in Church affairs are beginning at last to realize not only the value of the work which is done by the women in their parish, but also the inadequacy of its financial provision.

This is not a matter which can be put off until after the war,

but should be dealt with immediately. Anyone who is concerned with that field of work which lies on the borderline of Church and social work cannot but realize the necessity for providing women who are able to meet requests which are made with ever-increasing frequency for instruction and leadership in the faith. This does not seem to be realized by many people who are deeply involved only in Church affairs; but those who are concerned with spheres of activities into which the Church does not penetrate as deeply as she could recognize that there are many who desire instruction, who desire leadership and guidance in the knowledge of God and of His ways with man. The most vigorous, the most prayerful, the most consecrated people are required to meet this need, and it will be nothing less than a tragedy if it is allowed to pass by those bodies who are responsible for training and maintaining the women workers of the Church. The fact that all women workers, in addition to their theological and devotional training, gain instruction and experience in some form of practical work, either in teaching or social work, shows that they should be the people to answer this call. It is the duty of the Church authorities to enable them to do so.

I remain,
Yours truly,
CECILIA GOODENOUGH
(*Head of Talbot Settlement*).

TALBOT SETTLEMENT,
14, BROMLEY HILL,
BROMLEY, KENT.
March 3, 1942.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Miss Newby's article on Women's Work in the Church is timely as a record of achievement and in the note of anxiety which it sounds.

The comparative inability of the Church to provide a field of service and a secure and decently-paid livelihood for educated women, and a growing alienation among such women from the Church and hostility to clericalism, for such I fear there is, are not disconnected. At a time when the most masculine forms of service and of work are opened to women, and are being adequately done by them, the severe limitations to women's service in the Church become the more conspicuous.

Looking ahead, there are three issues of which the Church must clear its mind and have a vigorous policy.

1. The Church must think out and decide how fully women can be given really responsible work in the Church. In the making of that decision, principle will have to be carefully distinguished from mere conservatism or male trade unionism.

2. The Church must provide salaries for women, if not comparable to those paid in other services, at least as nearly comparable as clerical stipends are to those in other services.

3. It must provide women workers as much as the clergy with a first-class, competent training, bearing in mind that so long as women are not ordained, a large proportion of them will be specialists of one kind or another.

Yours truly,
LESLIE SHEFFIELD.

RANMOOR GRANGE,
SHEFFIELD 10.
March 13, 1942.

DAILY PRAYERS. By Eric Milner-White and G. W. Briggs. Oxford University Press. 5s.

In giving us this anthology of prayers the compilers have done a real service. The book is a companion to *The Daily Reading*, *The Daily Service*, *Prayers and Hymns for Use in Schools*, and *Prayers and Hymns for Junior Schools*. It will be particularly useful for schools and children's services, for it contains many prayers in sufficiently simple language to be easily understood by young people. Beyond this, the book will be of great use to those who have the responsibility of leading others in worship and to those who find such prayers helpful in their private devotions.

The compilers have drawn on many sources, ancient and modern. At the end there is a valuable section entitled " Prayers of Famous Men and Women," which contains prayers written by many of those whose names are household words wherever the history of our Church and people is known.

The main body of the book is arranged under subject headings, several subjects being grouped together under one main heading for each day of the week. One serious omission is a comprehensive index of authors and sources. It would be a help also if in any future edition the prayers were numbered so that a particular prayer could be more easily found.

The standard of the prayers chosen is high; even the modern ones are mostly written with a fine sense of the dignity of language. There are occasional lapses where the phrasing seems halting, and in one prayer " uphold " is made an intransitive verb; but these blemishes are rare, and it would be carping criticism to hold them against this very full compilation, which is probably the best existing anthology of prayers in the English language.

MICHAEL BRUCE.

CHIDDINGFOLD.

BOOK REVIEWS

MALVERN, 1941. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

The papers read at the Malvern Conference group themselves into four sets. There is a sociological set comprising Peck, Demant, Reckitt and Murry; a theological statement made by Mackinnon; a competent essay by T. S. Eliot on education, the application of which would be governed by the sociological and theological situation of the Church; finally, there are three incompetent papers—incompetent because they are irrelevant to the present situation.

The essential issues of Malvern, like the contemporary Christian dilemma, derive from the failure to correlate theological and sociological problems. This failure is rooted in the situation of man. This generation cannot be held exclusively responsible for it nor can they by any single measure or remedy transmute their situation. To assume the possibility of any such easy way out is a Pelagian oversimplification. Thus, when Miss Dorothy Sayers asks for an intellectual integrity which will respect the inspired insights of the artists, or when Sir R. Acland or Mr Kenneth Ingram demands State Socialism, they are irrelevant because, not understanding man's situation, they do not ask for enough or for that matter for the right things.

Mr Middleton Murry stated most clearly that the present situation of man is an arresting and critical challenge to the Church. The sociological description of that challenge was given very adequately by Fathers Peck and Demant. And, indeed, all the addresses without exception testify how *the world which man has made* tortures and disrupts his spiritual life. It should perhaps be stressed that the sociological analysis which was presented at Malvern is much more real and radical than the stale left wing Socialism which still echoes in our ears out of the last generation. The Malvern analysis is largely based on the realities of natural law as this appears to instructed eyes in our day under the inspiration of the tradition of St Augustine, St Thomas, and in a lesser measure Hooker. The statement might perhaps be described as founded upon a lively and contemporary understanding of the ordained order and relationship of material things conceived as the incarnate reality of our spiritual performance as a congregation. This order of nature we have distorted and defiled: and this wanton social sin is still unrepented. It is visited on generation after generation.

The scope of this review does not permit of any presentation of the sociological analysis presented by Frs Peck and Demant. Its importance, however, is great, and accordingly the original papers should be studied. But I cannot pass on to consider its

relationship to the theological statement without noticing a major error. Miss Dorothy Sayers writes: " The code of morality is . . . in fact a codification of the natural law. . . ." This is a complete reversal. Natural law started life with the ancients as that instinctive order which man has in common with the animals. It was developed by the Fathers to express the manifest order which God had imposed on his Creation and was used in this sense by Hooker. In our day it would be reasonable to extend it to include such fields of our knowledge as soil organization and ecology. The proper treatment of the soil, the degree of man's dependence thereon, and the crucial question of the implications which this responsibility for vegetation has for our new use of machines—these are the sort of issues which should come within the province of natural law.

At present, however, the theology of natural law appears to the layman to be in a most unsatisfactory state. When Fr Peck's sociological analysis was presented to the Malvern Conference after the Archbishop had asked, " Do we or do we not follow the reformers in their rejection of all natural theology?"—it seemed that the stage was set for the pronouncement which our situation demands. It fell to the lot of Mr Mackinnon to attempt the requisite theological statement. Mr Mackinnon made a very brilliant effort, but in my view he failed. In that failure Malvern failed.

I consider Mr Mackinnon's address to be both consistent and lucid. He ends up very much where Mr Murry does. " The only kind of Christianity that seems possible in existing society is a Christianity of desperation." It seems to me that Mr Mackinnon gets to this point by surrendering a position which he establishes most firmly in the early part of his address. In dealing with Creation his conclusion is: " Certainly if we refuse to allow that, in any sense, the schematization in analogical terms of the whole creature/creator relation is possible, we will inevitably restrict the sphere of that relation."

From this point Mr Mackinnon proceeds to expound very passionately the theology of the Crucifixion. We are reminded vividly that the present social system crucifies Christians anew. Much of the phrasing is professed Barthianism. Barth, I understand, lived in Germany. Of his situation, therefore, three sentences from Mr Murry are particularly descriptive. " The modern political society is so ubiquitous and all-pervasive that the individual is as it were dissolved into it. He cannot control the social consequences of his acts: he cannot even discern what they are. The part he plays is infinitely more passive than active." " In the atmosphere of such a society the Christian—at present anyhow—breathes with difficulty." Barthian theology is a theology of withdrawal particularly suited to the *present situation* of Christians. It is because of its political situation a theology of impotence. It is to be recognized, however, that the political

situation which thus renders the Christian impotent has been largely facilitated by the very theological symbolism which the Abbé Penido condemns.

To what extent is the pronouncement of Mr Mackinnon an adjustment to the present situation and not the governor of it? The question is the more important since it leads up to the assertion: " The incarnation is not the disclosing of certain universal cosmical principles: it is the manifestation of the divine word in the harsh particularities of an individual human existence." This provokes a query as to the relationship between " the whole creator/creature relation " and " cosmical principles." Can the separation of these two be justified on any other metaphysic than that of Kant, with this German philosopher's distinction between the sensuously perceived phenomenon and the " intelligible " (as distinct from sensed and thought) freedom of the individual will? Not only does his study of the world, by using thought to solve the jigsaw of sense, lead to a wrong view of God the Creator and His work; even to recognize the mere existence of His creature man he is driven to interpose the cryptic epistemology of the intelligible. On any other view but this, the flesh of man must be shown as indissociably bound with the rest of God's creation.

If we accept everything which Mr Mackinnon asserted—this sentence alone excepted—what is our position? We can admire the intensity of his perception of the contemporary spiritual situation. But this is to be judged as the metaphysical counterpart of Mr Murry's description of that same situation. It fails entirely to answer the question with which the whole Christian world is at this hour concerned. What is the authoritative theological pronouncement about creation—which appears to us under the guise of the world of here and now—which, with the coming of the machine, it has become our responsibility to manage?

Mr Mackinnon made much play with the ontological and with history. Is it not a fact of history that the incarnation of Christ was the inspiration of the management of the natural world in the thirteenth century. In the teeth of this, are we now to argue that redemption can only be personal? Can society not also be redeemed? Almost my first approach to theology was made by way of St Augustine's *City of God*. Was the secular society of the Roman Empire less evil in its capacity for " breaking men down from within " than contemporary plutocratic England? Even if the disintegration of to-day is more complete, does that mean that what the Grace of God achieved in those times it can no longer perform?

Why all this fascination by the impotence of the Christian situation? Has the Grace of God changed and failed us? St Augustine in his confessions equally recognized his own impotence. He knew that he was an empty vessel and that in

his own power he was nought. Nor had he the Pelagian facile optimism. It was his affirmation, however, that the Grace of God had worked powerfully and wonderfully through his intermediary. History asserts that it was the pleasure of God to give a social as well as a personal pattern to the redemption which He saw fit to work through St Augustine. A Christianity of desperation is not the whole revealed truth. Impotence is not the sum of the Christian situation.

I make no apology for insisting upon the theological issue of Malvern as I see it because the dilemma of our times is, I am convinced, a theological dilemma, and Christian sociology can only serve our day if and when that dilemma is fairly faced and grappled with. May I be permitted to remind the Archbishop of York that the social achievements cited by him in his retrospect were greater in Germany than in England? Whilst I recognize that what contributes to the good, contributes to the good, I am of the opinion that these achievements lie far from the heart of the social dilemma which is not in its roots different from that of the Christian.

K. E. Barlow.

Walsgrave-on-Sowe.

Is this a Christian Country? By E. G. Rupp. Sheldon Press. 1s. 6d.

This book is an addition to the Christian News-Letter Books. It contains many valuable features, but the limitations of space make it impossible to deal adequately with so vast a subject. In chap. i. the asking of this question is justified by the consideration that, despite the fact that all earthly institutions are "under the judgment of God," the past of our nation has been so bound up with Christianity that it is possible to discern the effect of this contact in the past and present and to make plans for the future. One criticism occurs to the mind. The author says that "history is a complexity of persons, ideas, things and events." He never mentions the power of institutions and the traditions they incarnate. The absence in the book of any mention of our Christian Monarchy is inexcusable and symptomatic.

In chap. ii the question of the relation between the theological conception of Christian liberty and our national ideas of freedom is treated, but not very satisfactorily, for he deals only with one partial aspect of national history—*i.e.*, the Reformation—and can only conclude that the Christians of sixteenth-century England "profoundly modified" the English ideal of freedom. But surely what we now want to know is how far it was a helpful modification. He speaks of the dissolution of the medieval unity (p. 20) without mentioning the positive achievements of that unity, and one feels that if in chap. ii he had remembered

the present dissolution of Protestantism which is confessed on p. 23, he might have had some explanation of the rise of the secular and utilitarian idea of freedom which, since the French Revolution (p. 20), has threatened the continuance of even the previous positive achievements.

So, too, in chap. iii, on the relation between the Christian tradition and democracy, the author considers only the influence of individual Christians and of small communities and societies of Christians upon the progress of democracy. The larger question of the relation between the great Church tradition and democracy is not even raised, unless a mention of Charles I, along with Oliver Cromwell, as contributing to "democratic England," should be taken to imply his answer. While it is true that the message of the Christian gospel is the only basis for Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the question we now need to answer is: How came the Gospel to make the impact with the *corporate* life of the nation in the past, and how best can it do so in the future?

In chap. iv it is admitted that the war has accelerated secularization, that the position of English youth is highly ambiguous, that our educational philosophy is too much controlled by American humanism and Unitarian theology, and that religion is being "elbowed out" of her proper public position.

In chap. v it is stated that the only answer the Church can give is (*a*) to become more sure of her Gospel, while at the same time understanding the problems of the secular mind; and (*b*) the Church must recognize that a revival now would mean the renewal of heresy and the introduction of manifold error, and that therefore the Church must refind Theology and let the Gospel itself settle what should be done in the practical sphere. But surely a book with this title should (*a*) assess all the elements in the present which have been influenced by our Christian past, and (*b*) analyze the attack on this inheritance, and (*c*) draw up a strategy and discuss the tactics necessary in the light of (*a*) and (*b*). Simply to say that the Church must be the Church is not very helpful.

In chap. vi the author treats National Vocation, and here he is at his best. His words on national character as against vague cosmopolitanism are most timely, but when he says that judgment on the nation is not revealed in the historical process, but only at the end of history, he surely must mean "not wholly revealed in the historical process." Certainly in the gospels the fall of Jerusalem is related to the judgment of the parousia.

In chap. vii he outlines some elements of a program, and the book should be bought and widely discussed because of this chapter. The author is not taken in by deistic or rationalistic cosmopolitanism, by idealistic garrulousness, by non-Christian sceptics posing as international idealists, by ecclesiastical introversion, by the equation of the economic man with the essence

of democracy, and by the " monstrous doctrine " that since all nations have sinned all are equally guilty.

" Then," said Hopeful, " these troubles and distresses that you go through in these waters are no sign that God hath forsaken you, but are sent to try you, whether you will call to mind that which hitherto you have received of His goodness and live upon Him in your distresses. Then they took courage."

H. K. Archdall.

Lampeter.

The Book of Isaiah. Vol. I (i-xxxix). By E. J. Kissane. Browne and Nolan. 21s.

In the preface to his latest work Dr Kissane, Professor of Biblical Theology at University College, Dublin, states clearly his main purpose in attempting a commentary on the Book of Isaiah. It is " to defend the traditional view that Isaiah is the author of all the prophecies, and to refute the fragment theory which is the basis of the modern criticism of the book."

The opening pages of the introduction are devoted to a survey, illustrated by a map, of the historical background against which Isaiah prophesied, emphasizing the essentially religious attitude of the prophet in contemporary politics. A tentative chronology is suggested, covering the main events of the period as they affected the Hebrew kingdoms. Then, after describing briefly each of the six sections, which he distinguishes in these chapters, he proceeds to consider the problems of authorship and composition, and here he has much that is stimulating and provocative to say.

It is the fate of many reactions, and Dr Kissane himself regards his work as " reactionary " when compared with other recent commentaries on Isaiah, to travel too far. And this will be the question always in the back of the critical reader's mind as he studies this book: does the writer, in his anxiety to establish the Isaianic (the form " Isaian " appears awkward to a non-Roman reader) authorship of the greater part of these chapters, go too far? A cursory glance at the introductory pages might lead the reader to fear the worst, for he will see the views not only of Duhm, but also of Gray, Procksch, and Oesterley and Robinson, classed as striking on account of their " inherent improbability." A closer study of the work as a whole, however, reveals a careful and charitable examination of the theories the writer is concerned to combat, and his obviously intimate acquaintance with the findings of modern as well as ancient scholarship demands from the reader both respectful and critical attention.

Gray had complained of the illegitimacy of the tacitly accepted canon of earlier critics: " what cannot be clearly proved to be

later than the age of Isaiah is the work of Isaiah." Dr Kissane, in effect, levels the same accusation against the modern critics. He alleges that "subjectivism plays a considerable part" in their theorizing, that "there is too great a tendency among commentators to rewrite the text in accordance with their own ideas," and that the criteria on which they rely "are often ambiguous or inconclusive." This must often have been felt by modern Bible students, who, in the absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, were powerless to protest. In this commentary the conclusions of the critics are fearlessly questioned, and, in the hands of a capable Old Testament and Semitic scholar, the same evidence is shown to be patient of very different interpretations. Prophecies and editorial matter are treated separately, as befits material differing not only in content, but also in form. The general results of the writer's examination of the prophecies in the light of political allusions, language and style, and ideas, may be quoted in full:

"1. Each prophecy is in poetic form, and consists of a number of strophes of regular length.

2. Each poem has a definite theme which is developed in a logical manner in the different strophes, each of which treats of a different aspect of the theme.

3. Each poem forms an integral part of a larger scheme. . . ."

Dr Kissane concludes that "as far as doctrinal content is concerned there is no poem in the book which does not fit in with the general scheme of Isaiah's teaching." Lest such a conclusion be hastily dismissed as too sweeping, it may be pointed out that the presence in the poems of occasional glosses is recognized, and the editorial matter, with the exception of the autobiographical narratives and the simplest form of introductory title, is regarded as non-Isaianic. While this commentary (and reference must be made to the body of the work for examples of the practical application of the principles enunciated in the introduction) upholds the traditional view of the authorship and date of these chapters of Isaiah, the writer cannot claim that his arguments are more conclusive than those of the critics. That he does not attempt to do so must be regarded as a point in his favour.

From the quotations already cited it will be seen that considerable attention is paid to the poetical structure of the prophecies. Dr Kissane sets out to examine the examples of Hebrew poetic form found in these chapters "without entering into details which are the subject of controversy." He makes the interesting suggestion that "it is better to speak of balance of thought rather than parallelism as the fundamental law of Hebrew poetry." This leads him on to his main thesis with regard to Hebrew poetry, that the verse, not the line or *stichos*, is the unit both of metre and sense, and, further, that a group of verses developing the same thought make up a strophe. On this basis it is maintained that:

" 1. The verses are joined together in groups (strophes) which vary in length from two to eight verses.

2. Each poem has a regular strophic system which is maintained throughout.

3. The strophic system employed is that of strophes of equal length . . ., with the exception of chap. xxxiii. . . ."

These principles, if accepted, are of great significance for the critical interpretation of the text.

After dealing with questions of authorship, date, and structure, the introduction closes with a few words about the Hebrew text of Isaiah, indicating the latest tendencies in textual criticism under the influence of such scholars as Professor G. R. Driver. Reference is also made to the Septuagint, which here, as elsewhere, so often assists the attempt to reconstruct the original Hebrew text. A full and useful bibliography is appended.

A word of praise is due to the original translation, and also to the general lay-out of the commentary, in which each section of the text is preceded by a short introduction, and followed by brief critical notes on the Hebrew text and the Versions, and by the main material of the commentary. Hebraists are warned in the preface against disappointment at what to them may appear a paucity of textual discussion, though they will agree that the writer has done his best to provide " sufficient material to enable them to assess the value of the emendations adopted."

There is no index, but no doubt one will be provided at the end of the promised second volume, to which all readers of the present work will eagerly look forward.

C. Witton-Davies.

St Michael's College,
Llandaff.

The Fourth Gospel: Its Significance and Environment. By R. H. Strachan. S.C.M. Press. 10s. 6d.

This revised and largely re-written edition of Dr Strachan's previous book, while it contains little that cannot be found elsewhere, reflects very well recent tendencies in the criticism of the Fourth Gospel; and because its writer is well informed and usually lucid, it should be of value to the general reader and the student of the English text.

Dr Strachan refers with approval to the work of Mr Gardner-Smith, who has presented a strong case for supposing that the fourth evangelist was not acquainted with the Gospel of Mark; he embodies some interesting pieces of exegesis from the work of Hugo Odeberg, and in the last few pages we begin to find references to the important commentary of the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns. He rejects all attempts at re-arranging the text, refuses to exaggerate the difference betwen the Synoptists and the fourth evangelist, particularly in their conception of miracle,

or to ignore the value of the gospel as a source for actual sayings of Jesus, or to deny that the controversies are based on records of disputes between Jesus and His opponents. The gospel is, however, in Dr Strachan's view, theological in character, and his commentary is mainly theological, though it is interspersed with valuable devotional reflections. In his view of history the author ranges himself with Hoskyns, C. H. Dodd, and the younger Cambridge school.

The Evangelist, who was probably a former member of the Sadducean party (Dr Strachan here follows the late Dr Burkitt) and himself " the other disciple " of xviii, 15, embodies in his gospel reminiscences of the apostle John, " the beloved disciple "; and his main object is to present " a theological interpretation of the human life based on actual traditions of the life and words of Jesus." He does not, however, impose an interpretation on the facts, but speaks " as though the facts themselves had a voice and a purpose in their own precise historical situation." Nor did he deliberately read into the narrative " a dogmatic conception embodied in the creed of the Church."

It is at this point that it seems to me Dr Strachan becomes confusing. If the theological approach to the gospel is the right one, it would seem obvious that behind it there must lie the central dogmas of the Church; and it is irritating to find Dr Strachan more than once referring to *mere* dogmas—*e.g.*, " the words, ' the Word became flesh,' etc., are not transcribed as a mere dogma of the Church." Surely without a belief in these mere dogmas the gospel remains unintelligible.

Again, in the comment on the words " do the truth," we are told that " doing the truth " involves not thinking of Jesus " through a mist of abstract theological doctrine or ecclesiastical prejudice," but " sincere and fearless thought and study, for only then will His words and example, appreciated in their original historical setting, become forces that operate on mind, conscience, and will." But according to other parts of the commentary this is just what we cannot do, for the traditions of the historical settings and the details of the history " emerge in the gospel as an inextricable blend of historical recollection and interpretative reflection." " Sometimes, as in the Lazarus story, the facts are dissolved in interpretation, fused in the crucible of an inspired imagination."

After reading this book, as after reading the more important commentary of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, one is left wondering whether we can remain satisfied with a type of exegesis which says in effect: " The facts recorded in this gospel speak their own interpretation, but we cannot be sure of the facts because the interpretation has often dissolved the historicity."

R. V. G. Tasker.

King's College, London.

I Am Persuaded. By Julian Duguid. Jonathan Cape. 12s. 6d. net.

This is a very uneven book, and consequently difficult to review fairly. In some places it is attractive, interesting and stimulating; in others it is dull and carelessly written. The book is in two parts: the earlier deals with the author's loss of his childhood's faith and, on the whole, is not too unworthy of the author of *Green Hell*, though towards the end it tends to degenerate into second-rate Sunday newspaper style in places; the latter part is rather a muddled account of the author's recovery of faith profusely illustrated in a variety of ways. The book throughout is unfortunately marred by inaccuracies and half-truths which detract from the effect of the obvious sincerity with which the author writes. It is disturbing to realize that a well-travelled and educated man can, with all sincerity, write much of what is in this book. Like other disturbing books about religion, this one ought to be read by Christians, particularly churchmen, who are inclined to complacency about the teaching and preaching of the Christian religion. Speaking of clergymen, the author writes (p. 66): "They were dispassionate, just and efficient, competent teachers of the young—in everything except religion." But the author does not draw the moral that more and not less true professionalism was necessary.

The author benefits and the reader suffers from uncertainty whether certain expressions of opinion during the description of the earlier stages represent the considered and final opinions of the author or merely the passing phase. In any case, the frequent inaccuracy often leads to unfairness. On p. 104, for example, after discussing with some fairness the deterioration of the two decades after the last war, he says that the citizen "remembers, contemptuously and above all, the silence of the Church during this period." One need not be labouring under any illusions about the failures of the Church when one suggests that "the citizen," who is probably rather like Mr Duguid, should improve his memory a little. A certain sneaking admiration must be felt for the genius for liberal paraphrase exhibited at the foot of p. 106: "At home the Catechism bids the citizen 'do his duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call him.' In other words, he is not to bother too much about overcrowding in the slums." Other words, indeed! If the author's taste is at fault in these matters, it is his judgment which betrays him in others. His ventures into science would have been better omitted. The mathematician will be interested to learn, on p. 117, that "mathematical proof is, therefore, no more than the skilled observation of forces whose rules we understand." And on p. 202, the false analogies drawn from magnetism make one wonder if the author, as a boy, ever played with a magnet. All this is a pity, for the point falsely illustrated is often quite a good one.

The author's serious consideration of theological questions, as distinct from his ecclesiastical abuse, is much fairer and more intelligent, though he does not avoid the pitfall of producing, as a novelty, what is only a truism of orthodox theology. An example of this is to be found on p. 203, where we are solemnly informed that " in this sense, therefore, it is inaccurate to think of God as a Person."

To sum up the reader's impressions is not an easy task. The book is not one to be recommended to the puzzled seeker for truth who needs a clear and accurate statement of the Christian religion in order to make his own criticism of the Church. But it ought to be read by anyone who thinks that every good-natured, intelligent Englishman is a Christian in mind as well as in heart.

C. D. WADDAMS.

CAMBRIDGE.

SHORT NOTICES

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. By R. R. Williams. Student Christian Movement Press. 3s.

This book, which is described as a " bird's-eye view of living Christianity," is a typical S.C.M. publication. Well printed, comprehensive, direct, and simple, it deals with the heritage and hopes of Christian people from Pliny to the Edinburgh Conference. The chapter on the older Christendom, which describes the building-up of Christian civilization, is followed by two equally instructive chapters on the worship and the faith of the Church. There is no " watering down " of the faith. The Creeds are explained and defended, but the writer states plainly that the simple Christian—*i.e.*, the man who is not a professional theologian—need not concern himself with the endless subtleties and refinements of each element of the faith. " The first and chief requirement is to have a grasp of the great essentials believed everywhere at all times by all: the sovereignty of God, the unique revelation and redemption in Jesus Christ, the present activity of the Holy Spirit through the Church." The vital connexion between religion and morality is well brought out in the section on the heritage of moral obligation, and there is a useful chapter on the Bible.

Finally, because " a heritage is not only to be accepted and developed, but carried on," Mr Williams discusses various suggestions for extending the faith.

This book seems thoroughly sound and can be confidently recommended for discussion groups, Confirmation candidates, or for use in senior classes in schools.

DEATH OVER HAGGERSTON. By H. A. Wilson. Mowbray. 3s. 6d.

According to the author's preface two facts led to the production of this little book, and the many friends of Fr Wilson and Saint Augustine's will be glad that the B.B.C. turned down his "postscript about Alice," and that he went on a foggy afternoon last January to the theatre with Dom Bernard Clements.

Fr Wilson describes afresh certain unique features of the well-loved Haggerston Church and its family life, gives notes of some of his wartime sermons, makes a composite picture, "Blitz Bits," from the war experiences of various contributors to the parish magazine, and tells how his literary efforts were stimulated by a day spent in Victoria Park, *e.g.*, in company with a "lump of cake, a bottle of beer, and (don't tell anybody) an apple."

The book is a well-documented record of what the world already knows and appreciates—namely, the unconquerable courage and cheerfulness, charity and resourcefulness of the East Ender in the Battle of Britain; but the story is told with a wealth of insight, human and humorous, which makes it well worth reading. Death in fearful shape hovers over a great part of the globe, but Fr Wilson is "thankful beyond measure that it is my good fortune to endure Hitler's war in the company of Haggerston women."

IS IT NOTHING TO YOU? By Jakób Jocz. Church Mission to Jews. 1s. 6d.

As a member for many years of the Society of Jews and Christians I am glad to have read this book, and most heartily endorse the words of the Bishop of Fulham: "To the Jew first, is a marching order which we have neglected. I pray that this book, by one who thoroughly knows his subject, may be used of God to stir up the Church."

Mr Jocz traces the history of his people from the beginnings of their national life in Egyptian captivity to the fall of Jerusalem, and from then he follows them into the various countries of their dispersion—Germany, Poland, France, and Holland. His aim is not primarily to record their martyrdom, but to remind the Christian Church of its overwhelming obligation in regard to the "Jewish problem." The physical state of Jewry is bad enough, with practically every door closed against it, but the spiritual anguish is, Mr Jocz claims, even more deplorable. Zionism has failed, politically and ideologically. The "back to the synagogue" movement is likewise doomed; reformed Judaism can only offer the dry bones of ethical humanism. "To such a people in so great a need we are called to point to Jesus, the Way, the Truth, and the Life."

As a Thief in the Night. By Frank Biggart, C.R. Mowbray. 2s.

" Many of us," says Fr Biggart in his preface, " are conscious of a strange and disquieting silence in the pulpit on the subject of the Second Advent of our Lord. Strange, in view of the teaching of the New Testament, and disquieting from the point of view of the pew."

This is probably not quite so true in these days of crisis as it would have been a few years ago, but the subject bristles with difficulties, and one wonders whether pastors and teachers will feel impelled to rush into speech after perusal of this essay.

The matter is well arranged. The undoubted belief of the Church as proclaimed in Creed, prayer, and hymn is arrestingly set out, followed by an admirable explanation of the word " Parousia," and there is an inspiring final chapter on the Eternal Coming, " the ultimate event, the final victory of God, the manifest completion of His whole creative and redemptive work to which the Bible, as a whole, looks forward."

It is the middle chapters which are somewhat disappointing. They deal with the examination of the sources, and tacitly or explicitly repudiate much recent scholarship. Space forbids more than one example—namely, that many critics would contend that the " growth " parables of the mustard seed, the leaven, and the seed sown secretly prove exactly the opposite of Fr Biggart's conclusions.

Marguerite Howse.

Peace for All Time. By R. H. Andrews. S.P.C.K. 2s. 6d.

This small volume is clearly the outcome of considerable experience in the teaching of prayer to an ordinary congregation; its wrapper describes it as " a book about prayer, regarded as the way to peace." It is clear and interestingly written, and its author carefully avoids the many heresies with which the path of prayer is beset. But it may be questioned whether the rather original diagrams may not confuse rather than help the uninstructed reader, and the section on corporate prayer, while full of useful practical suggestions, seems very deficient in any realization that what makes prayer corporate is not the gathering together of a lot of Christians in the same place at the same time, but the fact that each of them is a member of the *Corpus Mysticum*, which is the Catholic Church. With these qualifications the book is to be recommended; it might be well supplemented by a reading of Mr Bruce's article in Theology for February, 1940, on " The Corporate Element in Private Prayer."

E. L. Mascall.

STUDIES AND DOCUMENTS—XI. Family 13 (The Ferrar Group). The Text according to Mark, with a Collation of Codex 28 of the Gospels. By Kirsopp and Silva Lake. London: Christopher's; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1941. Pp. x+161, with 2 Plates. 15s.

"First make sure of your text" was a slogan of the late Professor Burkitt. It is therefore a little pathetic to find in the preface to this quite admirable study of one particular family of MSS. that "we do not know the original form of the gospels, and it is quite probable that we never shall." What we are given here is a thorough investigation of the MSS. of Family 13, representing very probably the text of Egypt brought by Origen to Palestine, and revised at Cæsarea into the text of Codex θ, and the text quoted by Origen and Eusebius. We are given in the Introduction some quite fascinating accounts of some of the MSS. of this group, and some interesting notes on some of the more important variants and the way in which they grew up. The text of St Mark is printed with a critical apparatus of the various MSS. of this group, which is usable because it is only confined to the one family. We have nothing but praise for an excellent specimen of this admirable series of "Studies and Documents."

If any reader of THEOLOGY is tempted to ask how we can be sure that we know the truth of the life and teaching of Jesus if we cannot be sure of the text, he may comfort himself with the thought that our ignorance of the precise text is due to the vast number of witnesses, whose wildest disagreements, as Bentley pointed out, do not alter by one iota the message of the Gospel.

WILFRED L. KNOX.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: E. S. Woods, *Things I Live By* (6d.).
CENTENARY PRESS: C. S. Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters* (5s.).
C.L.A.: J. F. Briscoe, *The Call and Challenge of Christ* (2s. 6d.); M. B. Reckitt, *The Meaning of Salvation* (2d.).
EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE: D. R. Davies, *Secular Illusion or Christian Realism?* (4s. 6d.); W. R. Matthews, *The Foundations of Peace* (2s. 6d.).
FABER: Daniel T. Jenkins, *The Nature of Catholicity* (5s.).
MACMILLAN: E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (12s. 6d.).
MOWBRAYS: K. Thorneycroft, *The Hem of His Garment* (1s. 6d.); A. Snell, *Understand Your Faith* (4s.).
SANDS: C. Dawson, *The Sword of the Spirit*; B. Ward, *The Defence of the West* (3d. each).
SHELDON PRESS: M. Reeves and J. Drewett, *What is Christian Education?* (1s. 6d.).
S.P.C.K. AND NATIONAL SOCIETY: B. K. Rattey, *The Making of the Synoptic Gospels* (2s. 6d.).

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